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Appeal to the world from the Bishop of Dili: 
''Open your _ eyes to the brutalities 
of Indonesia'' 
Less than a year after being appointed to replace Mgr Martinhu da 
Costa Lopes who was forced to resign as Bishop of Dili because 
of his outspoken condemnation of Indonesian atrocities, the ne.w 
Bishop (officially known as the Apostolic Administrator), Mgr 
Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo has made a forthright statement about 
the situation inside East Timor. The following is the text of a letter 
to his predecessor, now living in Lisbon: 
******* 
We here are in the worst socio-political conditions, as you 
know, from 8 August, the situation deteriorated. They arrested 
people in all the postos~OO people in Dili alone-and they are 
now being charged in military courts. Others were made to 
disappear. We don't know if these courts are impartial and if 
they have defence witnesses. In the kabupatens of Lospalos, 
Viqueque, Baucau and Ainaro, there is war and the population 
CHURCH REFUSING TO COOPERATE AT ALL LEVELS 
The Catholic Church in East Timor is adopting an attitude of 
complete non-cooperation with the Indonesian military forces. 
In addition to the outspoken letter from Mgr Belo, the following 
incidents have come to light: 
• A proposal by the Indonesian authorities that the territory of 
Oe-cussi, an enclave on the north coast of West Timor which was 
part of the former Portuguese colony, should be integrated into 
the Diocese of Atambua (West Timor) was rejected. When the 
proposal was made, Mgr Belo made a visit to the enclave against 
the wishes of the military. He was enthusiastically welcomed by 
the people of Oecussi who openly expressed their attachment to 
the East Timor church, giving him grounds to reject the · 
Indonesian move. ' 
• When General Benny Murdani, Commander-in Chief of the 
Armed Forces, made a visit to East Timor on Christmas Day last 
year, he held a meeting in Dili to which the priests and sisters 
had been invited. However, they all decided to boycott the 
meeting and persisted in doing · so despite pressure exerted on 
them to attend by intelligence agents. According to a 
communication from Jakarta, "it would have been difficult for 
them if people heard that they were meeting Murdani when 
everyone knew that a week later, there was going to be a great 
slaughter." (This refers to a new military operation that was due 
to commence on 2 January.) 
is coralled . They suffer illnesses, hunger,. lack of liberty and 
persecution. In Lospalos alone, there are ten battalions, and 
these bapaks are still not winning the war. They thought to end 
the affair by the end of December 1983 but we are already in 
February and there is no end in sight to the military operation. 
They have once more begun to mobilise the civilian populations 
in the kabupatens of Covalima, Ainaro, Same, Manatuto, 
Baucau and Viqueque. It is amazing that with so many 
battalions, helicopters, tanks and bomber aircraft, they still need 
the support of the rayat. And there go the men, armed with 
daggers and catana knives, leaving their fields and gardens. It's a 
misery, Monsignor. The Red Cross does not enter the prisons, 
nor can I celebrate mass for the political detainees in Comarca 
Prison. 
In Muapitini (Lospalos) and Iliomar, popular judgements 
have occurred and those implicated in contacts with the bush 
were murdered in front of the people, stabbed with knives, 
chopped with catanas and beaten with sticks and by their own 
families . It is a macabre situation in which we are living. This is 
more or 'Jess a weak image of how we are living. 
I ask Monsignor to continue to pray for us and make an 
appeal to the free world to open its eyes to the barbarities of 
which the Indonesians are capable. The Church is persecuted 
and accused, and our schools are searched and the students 
interrogated . The residence of the Salesian Fathers in Baucau 
was "savagely" searched by the nanggalas. Good Monsignor, I 
hope that this letter reaches your hands. Without anything 
special to add. I only ask you to look after our interests in the 
Metropole and convince the priests who are there to come back 
to Tiinor. 
United in the Lord, always at your service. 
Carlos Filipe X Belo, Apostolic Administrator. 
Dili, 16 February. (Original, handwritten in Portuguese) 
Postos: the administrative centres where the Timorese 
population has been forcibly resettled in concentration camps. 
Kabupatans: the districts of East Timor. 
Bapak: a deferential Indonesian term, used for Indonesian 
soldiers. 
Rayat: correctly, rakyat) people. 
Catana: a Timorese knife. 
Nanggala: knife-wielding troops of the paracommando corps, 
Kopassandha. 
British armoured cars in use to repress students, see page 11. 
East Timor 
Letters tell of new atrocities 
(l) 
The situation is extremely bad . Ger\ocide,·of the population in 
what is truly a concentration camp continues. Each settlement is 
notqing but an enclosure where the military can choose who ' 
they want to kill or torture . They pay generous sums of money to 
spies to get them to accuse anyone they wish to eliminate. This 
kind of warfare is being practised everywhere. Another kind is 
when the invaders are subject to surprise attacks on the roads by 
active , tough resistance fighters , or to surprise attacks on the 
military posts where they are stationed and several of the 
occupants are killed . In less than a ·montfil (from the end of 
February to the middle of March)., they buried about 50 
inhabitants in a single region (Ainaro-Sune) which is by no 
means the worst region . This is just one indication of the 
violence with which the fighting is proceedihg.' 
At the ~eginning of this month , the local military comrrnnder 
announced that he was giving the resistance ail ultimatu'm of one 
month to surrender, and if they did not do so. everyone would be 
killed. They are also infuriated because the Church has not 
called on the resistance to surrender (which would only result , as 
always . in their being killed) . Because of this, three important 
missions have been subjected to intense intimidation by the 
occupying forces. They have prevented the priests from mo".ing 
and carried off catechists; they have beaten up the teachers and . 
pupils of the mission schools. They have destroyed the residence 
of one pf the main missions on the pretext.that they discovered a 
transm.itter of the resistance in the building. They are more and 
more openly adopting an attitude of persecution towards the 
Church; this is not persecution by Muslims but by the 
government in order to conquer this piece of land. And the real 
reason is that the Church will not co-operate in inducing people 
to surrender a.s a way of accelerating the genocide of the 
population . 
In many settlements, they are forcing the population to kill 
people inside their own settlements ( ... ). They display an 
intense hatred for the local culture and for education in. the 
Portuguese language and even gq after peqple for greeting them 
with the words "bons dias", ("good~day" in Portuguese) . 
Tl:tere are sol9iers everywhere yet they announced that a 
dozen more battalions are coming, to launch a massive operation 
of extermination in the coming few we,eks. Who can it be who is 
helping them to escape from this dreadful degree of crimes and 
gt!nocide which disgraces the reputation of their o.wn country 
and is reducing our formerly happy people to a heap of corpses . . 
At the very least, churches throughout the world should show 
solidarity for these martyrs . March 1984. 
(2) 
We declare that on I February, 1984, there was a violent 
persecution of the population of Bobonaro. The people most 
severely struck were the populations of Cara-Bau, Cota-Boot, 
Cpli-Mau and Mali-Ubo in the region of Hauba, the 
administrative post of Bobonaro. From 1-13 February, they (the 
Indonesian troops) began to hunt down and arrest people . On 14 
February, they began to massacre the prisoners . 
At first they arrested two hansip (civil guard) members who 
had fought on their side for the past eight years, as well as a 
community figure who was suspected. The · red-berets 
(paracommando Kopassandha troops) tortured the two hansip§ 
with nails, needles , cigarettes and razor-blades , and killed .them 
both . They did not kill the community figure but broke his leg by 
striking it hard . He was then taken to the kecamatan sub-district 
(administration) office .in Bobonaro and made to sit at the door 
of the koramil (military sub-aistrict command) where he was 
ordered to identify people passing on the road . Whenever he 
pointed at anyone and said "that person collaborates with the 
guerrillas", the person was captured and killed without further 
investigation . In the month of February alone , more than fifty 
people were killed . But it is being said that the military plan to 
kill altogether 167 people in this zone . Only then, they say, will 
they be able to re-establish peace. 
A pupil of the mission school who attends the SMP 
(Indonesian lower middle school) lost his father and two uncles. 
All three were murdered by the military. Then , this school-boy 
whose name is Pedro , being full of anguish and sorrow, went to 
complain to the red-berets . Their response was to tie a rope 
round his neck and hang him on a tree. This is how the young 
Pedro, pupil of the SMP at Bobonaro , died for having wept for 
the death of his father . 
In the region of Hauba, they have forced the population to 
build new roads into the mountains. The troops take advantage 
of this forced labour to capture and kill some of the forced 
labourers. The families of those who were murdered-their 
mothers, spouses , children-have bt;en concentrated in the 
town. Some of those who were to have been killed escaped and 
fled . In these cases, the whole family are suspected (of helping) 
the escape. 
All homes are under surveillance, and the composition of 
each family is counted and compared with the number of 
inhabitants inside the house. If there are more inhabitants than 
members of the family or more members of the family than 
inhabitants, they are also suspected . 
Starting on 4 or 5 March for 5 days, they will organise a 
festival for the people tO swear loyalty to the military! 
Court trials, a cover-up for mas.sacres 
The Indonesian authorities have recently announceq. that 
Fretilin supporters are being tried for "treason", but the trials 
are just a cover-up for massacres of many Timorese who have 
been captured during the .military operations that were launched 
last August. · 
The trials were mentioned by Mario Carrascalao, the puppet 
governor of East Timar, in an interview with Australian 
correspondent, Leigh Mackay (West Australian, 20 Mar<,:h 
1984). He claimed that twelve people had already been tried and 
that another forty were awaiting trial. After asserting that all 
those in gaol would be tried and that "nobody will be held 
without trial", Carrascalao immediately contradicted himself by 
admitting that there were still 2,000 detainees, described as 
sympathisers and relatives of Fretilin members, being held on 
Atauro island who would not be released until "the situation is 
calm". 
Since then, several reports have been filed from Jakarta 
about the tri;lls in .Dili, the first time since 1975 that the 
Indonesians have thought to make use of the courts against 
members of the J)morese .resistance. An AP dispatch from 
Jakarta (South China Morning Post, 14 March 1984) reported 
that most of the Timorese are being charged with involvemen,t in 
an ambush. on 8 August when l6 Indonesian soldiers were killed. 
There are no reports abm~t how the trials have been conducted 
though it is not difficult to conclude that Indonesia's draconian 
anti-subversion law is now being put to use to accuse Timorese of 
commi!ting "treason" against an illegal force of occupation. 
. The re~en~ emphasis on prisoners has been reinforced by 
Indonesia's decision to allow the International Red Cross 
(ICRC) to resume prison visits, a programme that had to be 
abandoned last year when facilities were withdrawn shortly 
before the.1983 Indonesian offensive was launched. So fai:, the 
ICRC has been allowed to visit one prison in Dili. ICRC food 
relief programmes, also halted last year, have not been resumed. 
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Portuguese and Indonesian 
Bishops Speak Out 
The Catholic Church in Portugal as well as in Indonesia have 
both , for the firt time since the Indonesian invasion of East 
Timar eight years ago, taken a public position in support of the 
Timorese people. 
Portuguese bishops condemn genocide 
The statement of the Portuguese bishops, .issued on 28 
March , expresses solidarity with the people of East Timar "who 
aspire to the full expression of their individuality, and to prevent 
this is tantamount not merely to physical genocide but to what 
can be called 'cultural genocide', even more serious than the 
physical because it affects not only those who die but those who 
survive, the present generation as well as those to come". 
The Church, say the bishops, "must make its voice heard in 
order to stop the injustices being suffered by the Timorese 
people and to ensure that they can, themselves, determine their 
future in peace and liberty". TP.e statement ends with a call to 
the Portuguese Government, "historically, morally and 
juridically responsible':, to the Indonesian Goyernment, "the 
occupying power", to various international institutions which 
could act as mediators, and to Timorese political leaders inside 
the country as well as in exile, to do everything in their power to 
bring an end to this tragic and seemingly endless situation. 
MA WI: " ... victims of cruel oppression" 
The statement of the (Indonesian Bishops' Conference 
(MA WI) which was signed .by its president, Mgr F.X. 
Hadisumarta, and secretary, Mgr Leo Soekoto, came in 
response to a report about widespread hunger and repression in 
East Timar made to the MAWI 1983 meeting by Mgr Belo, 
Apostolic Administrator of Dili who attended the meeting as an 
observer. The statement, which was a message addressed to the 
Church and people of East Timar, recognised that the things 
most sacred to the people of that country are "their religion, 
their family and their land . In other words, respect for personal 
property rights , a higher value for the lives and dignity of 
mankind and behaviour which is both civilised and just." 
MA WI declared that "in spite of all the restrictions, (it) has 
made every possible effort to express its solidarity with the 
Faithful and the people of East Timor who are being deluged by 
most bitter trials both physically and spiritually". 
We cannot refuse to confront the events that are happening among 
the people , especially those affairs which determine the welfare or 
the misery of the masses who are involved in or who are the victims of 
cruel oppression. 
Church members express their grief 
From reliable sources in Jakarta, TAPOL has received 
informati9n that members of both the Catholic and Protestant 
churches in Indonesia are writing letters of condolence to 
President Suharto about the killings in East Timor as a way of 
recording and drawing attention to the continuing war. General 
Benny Murdani is known to be extremely angry at these letters 
but attempts to persuade the churches to stop writing in this way 
have failed . · ·· 
The former hca_d .of the Catholic <:hurc.h i~ East Tim?r, Mgr da Costa Lopes, is ~~ceive~ by the Pope in Rome. The Mgr told 
the UN Commzsszon of Hu'!1an Rights m G~neva on febru~;y 21, 1984 that the war will go on and on for as long as natural 
justice and freedom are demed to the East Timorese people . 
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East Timar 
Fretilin Peace Plan launched 
A Fretilin plan for negotiations leading to a just solution of the 
East Timor problem was made public in Lisbon on the occasion 
of an international solidarity meeting held there in March. The 
Peace Plan was originally outlined in a Fretilin document sent 
out in May 1983, during the period of the ceasefire and two 
months before Indonesia launched its 1983 offensive. 
The Peace Plan calls for: 
1. The holding of direct negotiations between Portugal , 
Indonesia and Fretilin, under UN auspices, to discuss the 
following: 
(a) the constitution of a truly impartial UN or multinational 
peace force as the indispensable condition to safeguard 
i. the functioning of a transitional administration; 
ii. the proper implementation of decisions reached during a 
separate dialogue between the two belligerent forces, Falintil 
and the Indonesian Armed Forces , regarding the deployment 
of their forces; 
(b) the holding of a free, democratic consultation of the people 
of East Timor; 
( c) the fixing of the date for the transfer of sovereignty. 
2. The right should be reserved for Australia to participate in 
the negotiations as an observer. 
3. Other observers may be chosen on the proposal of the three 
parties mentioned in point 1) in equal numbers, each of which 
shall be subject to the approval of the other two parties . 
Portuguese government preparing for sell-out 
The week after the peace plan was announced, President Eanes 
announced that he was convening an urgent meeting of the 
Council of State to discuss the situation in East Timor and to 
press for action by Portugal in favour of self-determination. It 
was understood that he was concerned by the lack of effective 
action by the Portuguese government to secure self-
determination for East Timor in accordance with the Portuguese 
Constitution (Article 307). Indeed, rumours were circulating at 
the time that the Portuguese government was already involved in 
secret negotiations with Indonesia. 
Although these rumours were initially denied, the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister, Jaime Gama made it known in Lisbon just 
before the Council of State meeting took place , that his 
government was indeed seeking a solution for East Timar. He 
told the press his government believes a solution can only be 
found by direct negotiations with Indonesia and "did not 
anticipate inclusion of Timorese representatives at this stage" . 
Gama told journalists that although Portugal does not 
recognise that the Timorese people have been consulted about 
their future, it did not intend to make self-determination or any 
other issue a condition for negotiating with Indonesia. 
According to Jill Jolliffe (Canberra Times, 1 April 1984), the 
government's policy involves recognising Indonesian sovereignty 
over East Timor and re-establishing diplomatic relations with 
Indonesia, and opening up a Portuguese consulate in Dili in an 
effort to promote and preserve Portuguese culture in East 
Tim or. 
Abilio Araujo, a Fretilin representative based in Lisbon 
described the Portuguese government's position as "completely 
immoral, a betrayal of everything they have been saying in 
recent years. The Timorese people will not accept any solution in 
which they do not take part." (Ibid.) 
It remains to be seen whether the Portuguese government can 
conclude a deal with Indonesia against the opposition not only of 
the President but also of a special Parliamentary Commission on 
East Tim or, whose chairman Deputy Sottomeyer Cardi a is 
known to be very much in favour of including Fretilin in the 
negotiations right from the start. 
Indonesian offensive halted 
Fretilin forces have successfully halted the huge Indonesian 
offensive launched last August , according to a report of a 
meeting of the Revolutionary Council for National Liberation 
that was held 1n East Timar on 16-18 March this year. The 
report said that 
the Indonesians are growing more and more demoralised by the fact 
that our activities cover almost all the territory . 
At the same time, the Revolutionary Council (known by its 
Portuguese acronym, CRRN) warns world opinion that the 
Indonesian military are continuing to inflict atrocities on the 
people of East Timor, and reports that 
The Indonesians have been saying they would massacre all our 
people without fear of international condemnation. 
Hundreds of civilians, including women and children were 
massacred at the height of the offensive from August to October 
last year, particularly in the regions of Los Palos and Viqueque, 
in the eastern part of the country. The CRRN report also spoke 
about "intimidation sessions" (probably the "people's 
judgements" mentioned in Mgr Bela's letter, see separate item) 
that had been held in villages in the eastern sector, during which 
Indonesian soldiers publicly tortured and beat suspected Fretilin 
supporters. Such "sessions" had occurred in the towns of Luro, 
Laga, Laivai and Saelari. 
The CRRN is the supreme council of the resistance 
movement in East Timar and includes representatives of the 
fighting units as well as of the population living in Indonesian-
occupied territory. The March CRRN meeting was held in 
Nakroma, the Fretilin name for the central sector of the country. 
Information from the 39-page report was released to the press in 
Lisbon on 16 April (Canberra Times, 17 April 1984). 
The meeting heard a report on the military situation by Kilik 
Wae Gae, chief-of-staff of Falintil, the Fretilin armed forces . He 
declared that the Indonesian forces were "bogged down" with 
heavy material on the roads and only able occasionally to send 
columns of troops into the mountains in search of Fretilin bases. 
(This would not be an easy operation anyway since the gu(frrilla 
bases are extremely mobile.) Kilik Wae Gae stressed that 
Fretilin forces have the "tactical superiority in the current phase 
of the strategic counter-offensive" . Indonesian plans to isolate 
resistance forces in the eastern sector have been thwarted 
because guerrillas are operating in all parts of the country. This 
has compelled the forces of occupation to relocate their troops. 
The war against East Timor 
by Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong 
A history of Indonesia's war of aggression in East Timar 
and of the stunning resurgence of the resi~tance movement 
under Fretilin's leadership following the heavy defeats of 
1977178. The book also analyses efforts to Indonesianise 
the military regime's "27th Province" politically, economi-
cally and socially, and describes conditions in the resettle-
ment camps created by the forces of occupation for pur-
poses of population control. 
Nine secret counter-insurgency documents of the In-
donesian Army are reproduced at length. 
Published by ZED Press. 
Publication date: May 1984. 
240 pages, with photographs. 
Probable price: £6.50. 
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West Papua 
Arnold Ap and others shot 
dead by security forces 
According to reports from several different sources', Arnold Ap, 
curator of the Anthropology Museum in Jayapura, and two 
other political prisoners have been shot dead by Indonesian 
troops. Ap was last seen alive in prison on 21 April; five days 
later, his body was seen at a hospital in Jayapura with three 
bullet wounds. The reports have led Amnesty International to 
launch an Urgent Action to protest against these killings. 
Arnold Ap was arrested by Kopassandha troops in Jayapura 
last November. He was well-known among West Papuans as a 
broadcaster as well as the promoter of Papuan culture, and his 
arrest caused great disquiet at the time. 
Eddy Mofu is the name of one of the other prisoners shot 
dead with Ap; the third man's name is not known . 
Sydney Morning Herald: 
" ... premeditated" 
Ten days before Ap's murder, a group of Australian journalists 
visiting Jayapura had been told that Arnold Ap was "all right" . 
Among them was Peter Hastings, Foreign Editor of the Sydney 
Morning Herald, well known for his strong sympathy for the 
Indones.ian military regime, particularly on the question of East 
Timor. In a feature article entitled, "The Murder of Arnold Ap" 
(SMH, 14 May 1984), he wrote: 
Why did they murder Ap? . .. They murdered him in premeditated 
fashion because he was an Irianese intellectual who personified 
Irianese culture which some powerful figures in Indonesia are not 
prepared to tolerate. 
There are no prizes for guessing who they are. The people who 
murdered Arnold Ap are the people who excused ill-thought-out 
policies in Irian Jaya with the question "do you want us to keep the 
place as a zoo?" 
Arnold Ap's murder is inexcusable on humanitarian grounds. On 
political grounds it is sheer lunacy. 
If the Indonesian Government wants to double the number of 
Irianese refugees, now a record 4,800 crossing into PNG; if it wants 
to go on senselessly alienating the Irianese, especially around 
Jayapura and the border; if it wants to entrench mounting PNG 
resentment; if it wants to indulge in the counter-productive exercise 
of generating Australian anti-Indonesian feelings, then murdering a 
defe~celess intellectual in prison is the right way to go about it . 
Below, a caricature drawn by Arnold Ap and published in Kabar dari 
Kampung, August 1983, the bulletin of Irja-DISC, the Irian Jaya 
Development Information Service Center. The caricature illustrates the 
harmful effects of a road to be built from Holtekang to Hamadi which will 
cut right across the Yotefa Bay. 
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West Papua 
- - --
Refugees' fate still uncertain 
In April in Jakarta, following a top level meeting involving both 
Murdani and Moch tar, the Indonesian press reported L 140 of 
the West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea would be 
returned . A similar report by the Indonesian press in March 
turned out to be untrue, and this one has yet to be verified by 
PNG . 
Violations of PNG 's border by Indonesian aircraft 
notwithstanding, the refugees are still ·the matter of greatest 
political and humanitarian concern to PNG. After the first wave 
of refugees from Jayapura arrived in Vanimo, hundreds more 
fled from villages along the border. Indonesian paratroops and 
aircraft are mounting an operation in the area to eliminate OPM 
resistance, and fighting has increased since the hijacking of a 
mission plane by the OPM in the village of Ubrub. The Swiss 
pilot and a teacher were later released in PNG, but two 
Indonesians, one military, on the aircraft were shot dead . 
The Catholic mission station at Kamberatoro has been 
inundated with over 400 refugees, and the village of Bewani with 
100 more. There are said to be at least 600 at the village of 
Mamamuro. The West Papuans have said they were frightened 
by the presence of Indonesian paratroops , and by clashes 
between them and OPM guerrillas. Many arrived in PNG 
suffering from malnutrition and exhaustion. his likely that the 
two aircraft that overflew Green River were· involved in this 
lndon~sian "clean-up" operation, euphemistically called an 
exercise. . · · · 
The PNG Government still stands by the UNHCR 
recognition of refugee status for the West Papuans , and has not 
said that any will be returned . Nor has it acceded to Indonesia's 
demand for a list of all the refugees, for fear of reprisals against 
their families . In Jakarta, Namaliu emphasised that the refugees 
woµld not be returned unless PNG was sure they would be 
treated humanely, and not harassed or forced from their land . 
Moch tar, however, has insisted that Indonesia has the right to 
punish those who have "broken the law". In PNG, some of the 
refugees have already been charged with illegal entry. On 22 
March. 73 of the West Papuans who fled from Jayapura in 
February were sentenced to six weeks in prison, although 
another 38 were found guilty but not convicted by a different 
magistrate. Subsequently, the 73 in prison went on hunger 
strike. There ha~ been enormous opposition to this treatment of 
the West Papuans in PNG , ranging from the Public Solicitors 
Office to the Bishop of Vanimo. But whatever the purpose of the 
convictions, they are unlikely to deter people fleeing for their 
lives. 
In the recent past , Prime Minister Somare has gone to 
considerable lengths to maintain ~ordial relations with 
Indonesia, usually by giving way to the demands and behaviour 
of PNG's stronger neighbour. The issue of the refugees has 
frustrated Somare's attempts to avoid disagreements with 
Indonesia , and the impression that the PNG Government merely 
hopes that the issue will go away has aroused widespread 
criticism. Indonesia continues to force more refugees into PNG 
by its military sweeps, while ai the same time demanding their 
return and adding to political tension. It is certainly not safe for 
the refugees to go back: even villages inside PNG have been 
evacuated for fear Indonesian troops will move over the border, 
as they have previously done. Meanwhile, the refugees must 
subsist on handouts from the UNHCR, the PNG Government 
and Australia; their fate is the undecided · factot in PNG's 
desperate attempts to extricate itself from its dilemma without 
offending Indonesia. 
T APOL has also received information that West Papuan 
villagers from the south, in the province of Merauke, have fled 
by sea into PNG. A group of 28 sailed through the Torres Straits 
and landed at a village 50 kms inside PNG; they are now in the 
coastal town of Daru. This would suggest that there are 
Indonesian military operations in the south of West Papua as 
well as in the north , the only area about which information has 
been received up till now. Merauke is the area in which 
Indonesia is concentrating most of its transmigration settlements 
(see TAPOL Bulletin No . 62). 
STOP PRESS 
Since the accompanying item was prepared , the refugee 
situation in Papua New Guinea has become much more 
serious. The PNG Government now appears to be ready 
to give way to Indonesian pressure, and to send some of 
the refugees back . T APOL has been told by the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees that there are now 6,000 West 
Papuans who have fled to PNG since February, the great 
majority of them since the middle of April. Mission 
stations like Kamberatoro near the border, have been 
flooded with men , women and children, and are finding 
themselves stretched beyond their limited resources . 
The UNHCR has been in constant contact with the 
Government in Port Moresby, but says it has no power to 
stop any refugees being sent back . It has also been in 
contact with Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja in Jakarta, but says there is a 'complete 
block' because Mochtar refuses to accept that the West 
Papuans are refugees , and has said that the UNHCR has 
no role to play in what is purely an "internal matter" . The 
PNG Government has said it will wait two weeks (as of 14 
May) before sending any of the refugees back, to allow the 
UNHCR time to interview more of them and to negotiate 
with Indonesia . But it seems very unlikely that Indonesia 
will back down at all, given its previous refusal even to 
acknowledge the problem. 
The enormous increase in the number of refugees 
coming over the border during the past few weeks suggests 
that the military sweeps have become worse . The refugees 
have said that Indonesian troops are conducting house-to-
house searches with great brutality, and are killing and 
torturing people indiscriminately to try to find OPM 
sympathisers (The Age, 30 April). It is reported that 
border posts have been heavily reinforc~d (West 
Australian, 5 May). With the situation as bad as it is, there 
are great fears among the refugees about what will happen 
to them if they are forced back into Indonesian hands. 
Since Indonesia refuses even to allow UNHCR officials 
into Jayapura , since fighting continues on the border; and 
since Indonesia has affirmed its right to punish "law-
breakers" among the West Papuans, their fears seem to be 
~well justified. 
~ne.ra u ini,. Anny. Cllief-o -Staff (left), discussing military operations 
m Inan Jaya with Ong-General Sembiring, military commander of the 
province. Major-General Ari Bandioko (centre) is Rudini's Assistant for 
Security. (Sinar Harapan, 3 April 1984.) 
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Papua New Guinea 
How Indonesia is squeezing PNG 
When Colonel Sebastian Ismail, the Indonesian Defence 
Attache in Port Moresby, arrived in Jakarta from Port Moresby 
and shouted , untruthfully, that he had been expelled, his 
apparent indignation convinced no-one in Papua New Guinea . 
Although he was threatened with expulsion due to his failure to 
inform anyone of Indonesian military "exercises" on the PNG/ 
West Papua border, he was also unpopular for his activities as 
leader of an Indonesian spy ring in PNG. Last year in August , a 
West Papuan refugee, Simon Allom, was convicted of the 
murder of Ismail's chauffeur, Meinard Poluan . At the trial , 
Allom said that Poluan had tried to recruit him as a spy, and that 
both Poluan and Ismail were involved in a covert operation, 
called "Pagar Betis" .1 More recently, the PNG and Australian 
press have given Indonesian interference and the variety of 
pressures on PNG more attention. 
The qiain object of "Pagar Betis" is to cripple OPM activities 
in PNG. There is alleged to be a list of prominent West Papuan 
refugees and PNG politicians hostile to Indonesia who are to be 
eliminated .. The spies, some recruited in PNG and others trained 
in Indonesia, have been ordered to find out the positions and 
strengths of both the OPM and the PNG Defence; Force. Many 
Papuans ~elieve thisoperation to be a preliminary to an inv"sion 
of Papua New Guinea, and point to the way in which Indonesia 
is transqiigrating military personnel to populate the area along 
the bqr9er with PNG. Certainly such a campaign of 
destabilisation is similar to "Operation Komodo", which aimed 
at disrupting East Timor just before the Indonesian in~asion in 
1975. (PNG Times, 15 March 1983.) 
The same West Papuan activists who might expect to be 
targets of , ."Pagar Betis'', have also found themselves being 
harassed by tjle PNG Nati~mal Intelligence Organisation (NIO). 
This has taken the form of house searches, interrogations and 
the confiscation of political documents; files are kept on all those 
considered to be involved in the OPM. 
Australia's defence interests 
The NI O's activities are better understood since the recent leak 
of.a document in Australia, describing that country's strategic 
priorities. Australia regards Indonesia as its only likely threat, 
but thinks that avoiding conflict with Indonesia at all costs is the 
best way of dealing with this threat. The document also 
described how Australia should "encourage PNG to take action 
wherever possible to suppress anti-Indonesian activity by Irian 
Jaya dissidents" (National Times, March 1984). The continued 
domination of the NIO by Australian expatriates is one means 
by which Australia can encourage such suppression. Australia 
regards Indonesian hostility to PNG over OPM resistance as a 
potential source of conflict in which Australia could become 
involved, and presumably hopes that suppression ·Of the West 
Papuan resistance might prevent such an eventuality. Both 
Indonesia and Australia would like PNG to follow such a policy 
and ignore the plight of people in West Papua. Given the 
sympathy in PNG for West Papuans, that is politically impossible 
for any PNG Government, but when the Indonesian military 
aggravate tension inside West Papua, as it has done recently, the 
problems spill over the border into PNG whether Somare likes it 
or not. The PNG Government is caught helplessly between the 
self-interested demands of its two giant neighbours, and is 
finding it impossible to oblige them. "Dislike of Indonesia in 
PNG is now running very high," said Rabbie Namaliu recently, 
"I Have every pressure on me not to send the frianese ·border 
crossers back to Indonesia." (Tribune 4 April.) . 
In the PNG Times on 12 April, an academic at the University 
of PNG gave a realistic appra~sal of PNG's position: 
It is evident that current activities along the border and Indonesia's 
unco-operative attitude threaten to inflame anti-Indonesian 
Indonesian officers on 'defence trials' tour in Ausatralia. (Cairns Post, 10 
March 1984.) 
sentiments in PNG. Indeed, they may well have added weight to the 
view that Indonesia harbours expansionist designs on PNG. In turn, 
. such anti-Indone!>ian sentiments may harden attitudes in Jakarta and 
produce continuing tensions between the two states, with 
unpredictable consequences .. . Indonesia seems to be over-applying 
the Thucydidesia,n rule that in international politics, the strong exact 
what they can and the weak grant what they mu~t. It is . the classic 
Lilliputian dilemma. And it is precisely this dilemma that'PNG must 
try to solve. · 
It is not helpful to assume that the OPM will be wiped out, and 
therefore it is only a matter of time before PNG is free of Indonesian 
harassment. It is true that the Indonesianisation program that is being 
implemented in Irian Jaya threatens to destroy the OPM in 
particular, and Melanesian culture in general. But even if PNG is 
unable to help its Melanesian brothers and sisters for reasons other 
than its uncaring attitude, its own security may be at risk if the limits 
of permissible Indonesian behaviour along the border are not clearly 
defined by both governments. 
1. The PNG Times writes that "Pagar Betis" means "to hobble". The 
Indonesian expression in fact means "fence of legs", the name used for 
anti-guerrilla sweeps against the resistance movement in East Timor 
during 1980-81 . 
Dutch and Australian Broadcasts Infuriate 
the Generals 
Radio Australia and Radio Netherlands, both of which 
beam regular broadcasts in Indonesian, English and Dutch 
that are widely followed in Indonesia, have been strongly 
attacked by Lieutenant-General Kahfi Surjadiredja, 
commander of the eastern territorial defence command 
(Kowilhan IV). 
Speaking at a seminar on developments in Irian Jaya in 
Jakarta this month, he bitterly complained that these two 
world broadcasting systems were "dominating the flow of 
news on Irian Jaya" and admitted that these reports "could 
be detrimental to the Indonesian Government" (The Age 2 
May, 1984). Indonesia censors all foreign printed media 
on arrival in Indonesia but is helpless to control foreign 
broadcasts, though it closed down Radio Australia's 
• Jakarta office in 1980. 
Lieutenant-General Kahfi said that in an attempt to 
counteract the effects of Dutch and Australian broadcasts, 
· Indonesia is planning to build a 250-kilowatt transmitter 
on . · the outskirts of Jakarta .that will relay official 
' broadcasts to an estimated 30 million people who inhabit 
the eastern region of Indonesia. 
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West Papua interview 
Seth Rumkorem on human rights in West Papua 
Seth Rumkorem has for many years been a leader of the OPM Free Papua Movement in West Papua, fighting a guerrilla war against 
Indonesian forces from the jungle. He left West Papua in 1982, after a decision by the OPM that he should go abroad to publicise the 
situation there , but was apprehended by PNG authorities as he and nine companions tried to reach Vanuatu by boat. He was acquitted of 
the charge of illegal entry, and allowed to stay in Rabaul. In December 1982, however, he had to leave PNG, as Prime Minister Somare 
was about to make an official visit to Jakarta and was anxious to avoid any criticism by Suharto over tolerance of the OPM. The United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees asked the Greek government to give him temporary asylum, and he has been allowed to stay in 
Athens indefinitely with two other OPM members. He has tried to find another country more suited to advancing the OPM cause which 
would offer him asylum, so far without success, and is working to establish links with similar organisations. The interview was conducted 
with the help of Luis Nussy, one of the OPM members with Seth. This is the second part of the interview. For the first part, see TAPOL 
Bulletin No . 62, March 1984. 
From what you have already said, it is clear that the OPM is 
strong in many parts of West Papua. How do the Indonesians 
respond to OPM operations? 
On many occasions, they have entered the kampungs and 
murdered innocent people. This is clear from their "Operation 
Wibawa" (Operation Authority) , "Operation Sadar" (Operation 
Consciousness), "Operation Kikis l" and "Operation Kikis 2" 
(the First and Second "Chipping-Away" Operations). During 
the first two operations, the Indonesians did not go into the 
jungle, but murdered and terrorised people in the villages 
instead . The Indonesian objective here was to intimidate people 
in the period leading up to the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969. 
They claimed they would convince the people to agree to 
integrate with Indonesia, and they aimed to assert their authority 
over West Papuans . In the course of these operations, 30,000 
Papuan people died. 
During "Operation Kikis 1 and 2", most of those killed by the 
Indonesian military were women and children . Indonesia wished 
to prevent a new generation being born, so that Papuan children 
would not grow up to join in the fight against Indonesia . Another 
tactic they used was to poison the West Papuan leadership . 
Godfry Mirino, a member of the Indonesian Parliament was 
one . Then Nikolas Tanggahma, a former member of the New 
Guinea Council, was poisoned in Manokwari. The first deputy 
governor of Irian Jaya, James Mamobiro, as well as Silas Papare 
and Baldus Mofu were all poisoned , and Franz Kaisieppo , 
governor from 1964 to 1973 , was poisoned in Jakarta. 
They also aim in the long term , to change the character of 
Papuan youth, by encouraging uncontrolled prostitution, even 
for under-age youngsters. This has caused the spread of venereal 
diseases , and a report from the Provincial Government stated 
that 75% of the people afflicted with syphilis and gonorrhoea are 
youngsters. The army freely distributes pornographic 
photographs and films, marijuana and other drugs, sometimes 
with the help of teachers and heads of schools. The OPM 
discovered a lot about this sort of thing in June and August 1981 
in Wamena and Jayapura. 
During "Operation Kikis 3" and "Operation Sapu Bersih" 
(Operation Clean Sweep), Indonesian forces impaled the heads 
of those suspected of being sympathetic to the OPM, who had 
been killed in the bush, and displayed the heads to people.held in 
the prisons run by the army, navy and police . 
What about other human rights abuses committed by the 
Indonesians? What do you know about these from your own 
experience? 
While I was an intelligence officer in the Indonesian Army, I 
became very familiar with reports received at army HQ. Then in 
1968, I was in Biak and heard about ill-treatment from people 
who came to my father to protest. I have spoken a great deal 
with people who have witnessed or suffered inhuman treatment 
at the hands of Indonesian troops, and when I was myself 
arrested for the third time by security forces in Biak, I saw it with 
my own eyes. 
In West Papua, two out of every ten native inhabitants have 
experienced imprisonment, from one day up to five years . All 
these people, however long they were imprisoned, have been 
tortured , and prisoners are still being tortured. The instruments 
used include red-hot irons, the tail of the sting-ray, electric 
current and other barbaric abuses. No differentiation is made 
between small children, women or men; all are treated alike . 
Esther Yanteo was the head of a girls school in Semi in 1969, and 
a member of the Gerakan Nasional Papua. When Indonesian 
security officers learnt that she was a member of the liberation 
movement, she was arrested. During her interrogation, they 
tried to make her speak by forcing her to strip naked, then 
burning her sexual organ with cigarettes. Once, when I was at 
my father 's home, some relatives from Mumfor described how 
Indonesians had behaved in Jemburwo. Women were raped, 
then sand was put into their vaginas. The men who protested 
were put into sacks and dropped into the sea. As for the six 
women arrested and detained by the Cendrawasih XVII Military 
Command, in their letters to me they said that the soldiers had 
tied their hands and feet, then did anything they wanted with 
them. 
Seth Rumkorem in West Papua. 
Even corpses are maltreated. For example, Dantje Bitbit, my 
personal courier was beaten until he was half-dead, in the 
kampung of Wagena on the island of Yarsun. When he was 
dead, the soldiers used his corpse as a bench to sit on, then, 
before leaving the kampung, they cut his body into pieces, and 
ordered the villagers not to bury them, but to leave the pieces 
where they were . 
8 T APOL Bulletin No. 63 May 1984 
I saw many examples of torture while I was in the Navy prison 
in Biak , especially of local community leaders. Mr Borai , the 
secretary of the bupati of Biak, was so severely beaten that many 
of his bones were broken , but he was not given any medical 
assistance. The head and English teacher at the SMA (secondary 
school) in Biak, Mr Major, was left all night in a tub of water, 
and Utrecht Wompere was beaten until he was close to death, 
and thrown about like an animal. Some other prisoners took him 
back to his cell, and we nursed him for three weeks with 
medicines that had been smuggled in . When there was a cholera 
outbreak in Asmat everyone in the Navy detention centre was 
vaccinated, but the doctor used only one needle for 84 prisoners. 
We were all afraid of catching infections, but could do nothing 
but pray to God that we would be all right. The Navy doctors did 
nothing to help those who were sick, gave them no medicine, 
and just left them to die. One victim of this was Mr Faidiban, a 
mechanic with the DAMRI bus company. 
One of our Warrant Officers, Obeth Sabuni came to Biak and 
shot dead four Indonesian soldiers and the son of the bupati of 
Jayapura, then ran away because he had no more bullets. He was 
shot in the leg by Indonesian forces. Instead of taking him to 
hospital, they took him straight to the interrogation room, where 
he was tortured to make him reveal secrets before being killed . 
Warrant Officer Jahje Ojaitouw and Sergeant-Major Ben 
Demena were held for 18 months by military police of 
Cendrawasih Military Command, tied hand and foot with chains. 
Their food and water were just thrown at them, and they were 
lucky if they could catch anything to eat or drink. Ben and two 
companions were cut into pieces, tied up in sacks and thrown 
into the sea so that no-one would know anything about them. 
Indonesian military authorities usually like to eliminate 
prisoners they consider to be too dangerous to return to the 
community. Marthin Luther Waren was a guerrilla leader 
arrested in Sarmi in June 1970, together with Daan Kafiar, 
presently in Sweden, Baltazar Ortumilena and Keleopas 
Jarisetouw. After he had signed a release document, he was 
allowed out in August 1972, and Daan and Kalaopas saw him 
being offered a lift in a non-military vehicle by an intelligence 
officer . Marthin left with this man, and since then no-one knows 
what has become of him. The vehicle had the number DS 101, a 
well-known vehicle involved in similar disappearances in 
Jayapura. Now, when his relatives ask about him, the prison 
officials say he is no longer there , and show his signed release 
order. 
Pregnant women are not spared torture, as I can show by 
giving an example from "Operation Wibawa". Because of the 
general amnesty announced by Suharto after the "Act of Free 
Choice" in 1969, everyone came out of the jungle and returned 
to their villages. But in May 1970, a number of women were 
murdered during two visits by a unit of the Udayana Division. 
One woman was heavily pregnant, and the army shot her in the 
stomach, cut out the unborn baby and cut it into two in front of 
the almost dead mother and 84 other women and children. This 
woman's name was Maria Bonsapia, the older sister of the 
primary school teacher Juliana Bonsapia, who was killed in the 
second operation . Before being killed, she was raped by twenty-
five soldiers, who then cut her genitals with a bayonet. During 
"Operation Sapu Bersih" 500 people from the kampung of Sre-
Sre in Lereh kecamatan, were killed, including one pregnant 
woman who was burnt alive. 
The Indonesians claim they are bringing in the benefits of 
modernisation and spending large amounts of money to assist the 
Papuan people. How true are these claims? 
The Indonesians always make exaggerated claims about 
bringing progress to lrian Jaya. As far as I have seen, there has 
been no development in practice, only a lot of plans on paper. 
Take, for example, Indonesia's budget in Irian Jaya for 1982/3 
and compare it with the value of exports from the Indonesian 
Office of Statistics for 1978: the budget amounts to some 64 
million US dollars, whereas the value of exports for 1978 was 
around one billion US dollars. Roads, like the planned Trans 
Irian highway, are built purely for military purposes, to prevent 
the guerrillas operating from PNG, and to protect foreign 
investment in West Papua. Road construction has nothing to do 
with the welfare of the Papuan people . 
Education seems to me to have deteriorated since the Dutch 
left. Under the Dutch, there were more Papuan teachers , and 
they were not restricted by the Indonesian education system. 
The fighters I have helped train who were educated under the 
Dutch have a better general knowledge than those educated by 
Indonesia , because the Indonesian teachers concentrate on 
indoctrinating their pupils with Indonesian nationalist 
propaganda, For them, knowing Pancasila is the most important 
part of education. 
In health matters , the situation is far, far worse than before. 
Four Dutch health departments used to deal with malaria , TB, 
yaws and leprosy, but now the death rate from these and other 
diseases is increasing. Diseases like syphilis, gonorrhoea and 
cholera have become much more widespread. There are 
Indonesian Puskemas (community health centres) but outside 
the main towns these consist only of a building and a nurse, with 
no medicines. In OPM liberated zones , we have our own medical 
services, such as those in the kecamatens of Bonggo, Betaf, 
Dabra, Samanente, Kasnawedja and Unurum-Guai. We must 
also go outside our areas to provide medical treatment. 
I don't like to suggest that the Dutch period ·was our "Golden 
Era", but it rrtakes me sad to note that had Indonesia done 
anything at all to promote our agriculture, West Papua would be 
more prosperous than many other parts of Indonesia . The Dutch 
started several agricultural projects, such as the "Kumbe" rice 
project around Merauke, cocoa estates in Serui, and coffee and 
rubber estates, all of which have been neglected and have 
reverted back to jungle again. Our livestock has suffered from 
the introduction of diseases which did not exist in West Papua 
previously . Some animals which have been brought in under the 
"Livestock Improvement" program, for instance the pigs 
brought to Wamena and Enarotali from Krawang in Java, have 
been infected with worms and other diseases which have caused 
the death of many Papuan people. Indonesia takes a great deal 
from our country, and there is an enormous gap between what 
they have profited and the little they put back. 
What is the OPM's attitude towards transmigrants? If and when 
you achieve liberation, you may find that the majority of people 
living in West Papua are, by that time, Javanese transmigrants. 
What would you do with them? 
These people are quite innocent. They have been forced or 
encouraged by Indonesia to go to West Papua. This problem 
presents us with a great challenge. It would be inhuman of us to 
return them to Java where there is no more land for them, and 
no future. We would like our state to be one with many ethnic 
groups, and we would like to have an open immigration policy 
which encourages skilled people from all over the world to help 
develop our country and its abundant natural resources. There 
would of course be a number of difficulties; the Papuan people 
are at a stage where they cannot compete with people coming in 
from outside. This is why now, even more than after our 
liberation, we have to bring up their level of social, political and 
economic awareness to match the immigrants. 
We do not believe that the Javanese transmigrants should be 
sent back to Java, although there are many Papuans who do. 
They should be allowed to stay, but unfortunately most of them 
are not well educated, and they do not have skills to offer which 
Papuans don't yet have. This may sound very inhuman, but the 
transmigrants would have to become second-class citizens, we 
would have to discriminate positively in favour of the native 
inhabitants. This is not our fault. The Indonesians have brought 
in such a large, unskilled immigrant population. The root of the 
problem is Indonesia's refusal to recognise our right of self-
determination. Because of this, a strong anti-Indonesian 
sentiment has developed among Papuan people, and an ex-
tremely complex situation has been made worse by the 
transmigration policy. If Indonesia were to recognise this right, 
we could co-operate in finding a solution to the transmigrant 
problem before it becomes worse . Those who. agree with me 
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Diploniacy turns sour between Indonesia 
and PNG 
Relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia have 
continued to deteriorate since two Indonesian aircraft flew over 
the PNG/West Papua border and allegedly fired a rocket over 
the village of Green River . PNG has been infuriated by 
Indonesia's contradictory excuses, and its deliberate indifference 
to PNG's concern over a serious violation of its territory . There 
has been intense military activity by · Indonesian troops and 
aircraft on the border; fighting between them and OPM 
guerrillas has continued ever since the uprising in Jayapura in 
February . (See TAPOL Bulletin No . 62, March 1984:) 
27 March: Two Indonesian F5 jet fignters crossed the PNG/West 
Papua border, and circled the Green Rover patrol post three 
times, flying low. On the third turn, one aircraft fired a projectile 
of some sort: "There was a flash and a lot of smoke, but no 
explosion" said one government official, "The whole station staff 
of about seventy saw the incident ... some hundreds of people 
in the immediate area took to the bush and panicked." (Sydney 
Morning Herald 28 March .) Indonesian aircraft used plastic 
bombs to frighten people during border incursions in 1978, and it 
is possible that the Green River incident involved a dud rocket to 
achieve the same effect. 
28-30 March: Indonesian Ambassador, Brigadier General 
Supomo, was handed a formal note of protest about the border 
violation by PNG Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, and 
warned that the Indonesian Defence Attache would be asked to 
leave if a satisfactory answer was not received . The Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry did not deny the incursion at first, and 
indicated that the aircraft might have been part of an "exercise" 
held near the border. Supomo, however, had already been 
instructed, probably by the military , to deny that the jets were 
Indonesian . PNG requested urgent talks with Indonesia, but 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja said that they could not take place 
until he had returned from a trip to Moscow. When asked about 
the incident, Mochtar replied "Don't ask me, ask the army ." 
(Far Eastern Economic Review 12 April.) Ambassador Supomo 
was equally ill-informed: when asked about fighting between 
Indonesian troops and the OPM on the border he said "I cannot 
comment because I do not have any information ... I do not 
comment on matters related to the OPM; that is not my 
concern." (PNG Times 29 March .) 
Continued from page 9 
believe in a humanitarian solution. But we need to consider very 
carefully how we would handle such a delicate problem . We 
have already suffered enough because of it. 
It is well known that at the moment, Indonesia tends to ignore the 
traditions and land rights of the people in West Papua, in pursuit 
of their policies. How would you deal with the possible conflicts 
that might arise between traditions and land rights, and your 
progressive policies? 
You are right to ask such a question, for we need to consider 
the future in such a way as to avoid creating new difficulties for 
ourselves. The Indonesians offer an example of what must not be 
done. They simply try to forte people to abandon their customs 
and land rights, and cause great hostility to theirbehaviour. The 
question of traditional land rights is an integral part of our 
customs, and we shall of course try to preserve them as much as 
possible. But there certainly will be conflicts between these 
traditional interests and our desire for modernisation. What we 
must do is to increase the political awareness of the people, and 
at the same time strengthen the understanding between us. This 
way we can find agreement over our policies; for instance, if we 
wish to build a road, we can explain better the difficulties facing 
the government should people demand a level of compensation 
the government cannot afford. In PNG, there is often trouble 
because of disagreements between the government and people 
over the compensation which ought to be paid for land. Land 
3 April: Indonesian military spokesman, Emir Mangaweang, 
denied that Indonesian jets had violated PNG airspace, and then 
described "border exercises" that had occurred on the same day 
involving jet fighters and other aircraft. He stated . that j~ts 
had gone in search ofa mission plane held up by the OPM, which 
was found in Ubrub, well inside the Indonesian side of the 
border, and that on return, they had gone through the sound 
barrier, apparently at the request of the Irian Jaya Governor_ to 
"arouse a sense of pride in the people" (Sinar Harapan 3 Apnl). 
It was suggested that people in Green River had thought this was 
a rocket being fired , and even that they mistook aircraft 30 kms 
away for attacking jets . 
Following a second protest note from PNG, Indonesia 
announced it was formally withdrawing the Defence Attache on 
5 April. 
12 April: The Defence Attache, Colonel Ismail, returned to 
Jakarta and shouted bellicosely on arrival at the airport, "I have 
been expelled" (Tempo 12 April) . Armed Forces Chief Benny 
Murdani also insisted this was the case, and said he found PNG's 
expulsion "incomprehensible". He said, in response to 
Namaliu's request that PNG should be informed about border 
exercises, that it was Indonesia's own business where it carried 
out military exercises. The "expulsion" provided Jakarta with an 
issue on which to protest, thus counterbalancing PNG's protest 
about violation of its territory. 
15 April: Namaliu met Mochtar for the long awaited talks, but 
no agreement could be reached about · the jet incident, as 
Moch tar had by then adopted the military view. No agreement 
was reached over other issues either. Namaliu made a strong 
statement to the Indonesian press, protesting the border 
violations, asking Indonesia to halt its exercises, and insisting 
that no refugees would be returned until PNG could be sure they 
would be treated humanely. Indonesia maintained its denial, and 
accused PNG of helping the OPM. · 
These tortuous diplomatic exchanges indicate a conflict 
between the respective approaches of the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry and the Armed Forces leadership. Typically, the 
Armed Forces view predominated, and the Indonesian official 
line has been to deny the border incursion since the beginning of 
April. This has created a · diplomatic impasse between the two 
countries which shows no sign yet of being solved. 
rights in West Papua follow the same pattern as in the whole of 
Melanesia. They are inherited from generation to generation, 
and they are collective rights; land is the property of the marga 
or kampung (village). I don't own land personally, but only 
through my marga, so that it cannot be bought or sold, as in 
other countries, and I cannot buy the land of my neighbour to 
add to my own. 
There are some things in West Papuan society which must 
change, because they are not in accordance with our Christian 
beliefs. Customs such as taking revenge by head-hunting 
cannot be retained iri a modern society, but we can't insist that 
all such anachronisms are given up immediately. Again, it is a 
matter of getting people to understand our ideas at their own 
pace. 
Our revolution must, as far as possible, retain its Melanesian 
identity, and many customs will serve as the basis for important 
social, political and economic institutions in the future. Our 
collective society puts the emphasis on local co-operative effort, 
and is not divided between rich and poor. Hopefully we should 
be able to avoid the class conflicts which disturb so much of the 
world. Many countries _ searching for independence and 
modernisation have abandoned their identities, and have been 
forced to make the choice between falling under the influence of 
different outside powers. This is a vital issue to which we must 
give a great deal of thought, just how much and how quickly we 
can modernise our society. 
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British armoured cars in Indonesia 
:~.· 
A letter from a student, 
Jogjakarta 1978 
... The most terrible things happened here in Jogjakarta . On two 
occasions. the Army handled students in an unusually brutal manner. 
As you can well imagine, we were powerless against bayonets, fire-
arms and panzers. The military began to use their bayonets and to 
shoot at random . Just imagine 2,000 students fleeing in complete 
disorder - some crawling away on their bellies. some screaming 
hysterically as they fled, some falling to the ground. It was like a 
battle, •.ike the Vietnam war. 
The whole thing began on 25 February when an open meeting 
was convened to discuss the present situation and the corrupt state 
apparatus. Students came to this meeting in droves, there were 
thousands of them . The.n the Army arrived . They closed all roads 
leading to the campus so that no-one could get in or out. With the 
university grounds completely surrounded , they then proceeded to 
break up the meeting by force. They closed in on the encircled 
students with their weapons: stabbing with their bayonets, firing 
their rifles at random, kicking students and throwing them to the 
ground. I think th.e soldiers shot downwards.intentionally as there 
were bullet-holes just half a metre from the ground and some 
students were wounded in the legs and thighs. 
A student being arrested and dragged onto the 
'" back of a Ferret-Scout armoured car in Jakarta. 
From TAPOL Bulletin No . 27, June 1978 Saladin armoured car. 
Richard Luce, Minister at 
the Foreign Office, wrote in 
a letter on 12 April 1984: 
" we would not 
approve the supply of 
arms if we believed the 
equipment was likely to 
be used for internal 
repression or to violate 
human rights ... " 
Photos from Indonesia Committee, Amsterdam. Saracen on the streets of Jogja, January 1978. 
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Indonesia and the World 
IGGI aid could continue ''for 
another 20 years" 
IGGI aid to Indonesia this year will be ~t least as much as last 
year ($2.4 billion), according to Mrs Schoo, Dutch Minister for 
Overseas Aid . Expressing enthusiasm for Indonesia's economic 
performance, at the end of a visit to Jakarta in April, Mrs Schoo 
said that the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia would 
continue to support Indonesia until it no longer needs help . "We 
have supported Indonesia for the past 20 years", she said, "and I 
can't see why we shouldn't be able to go on doing so for another 
20 years ." (Kompas. 23 April, 1984.) 
According to Kompas , the IGGI has provided altogether 
$22 .3 billion to Indonesia since it was established in 1976 (less 
than two years after the military came to power) . (See T APOL 
Bulletin No 59, September 1983, p. 22 for annual breakdown of 
IGGI aid .) 
Human Rights and Aid 
Prior to her departure for Indonesia , Mrs Schoo was under 
strong pressure in Parliament and in the Dutch press to take 
account of the massive human rights violations currently being 
committed by Indonesia, particularly the death-squad killings, 
and the widespread persecution and killings now under way in 
West Papua and East Timar. Although she was quoted by one 
Dutch newspaper (NRC Handelsblad, 16 April) at the time of 
her departure as saying that she believes "the level of 
development assistance should be linked to a country's respect 
for human rights", she expressed the connection in very different 
terms after her return : 
I don't believe in using development assistance as a sanction . It is one 
of the aims of development assistance to create a situation in which 
people have enough to eat, can live a healthy life and the children can 
go to school. .. Human rights problems prevail in all developing 
countries. If we use respect for human rights as a sanction, it is as if 
we are punishing underdeveloped countries for what is a 
characteristic of underdevelopment. (Source: NRC Handelsblad, 28 
April 1984.) 
Mrs Schoo did pot explain how genocidal persecution in East 
Timar and West Papua has anything to do with 
underdevelopment. 
Having given this explanation, she had some difficulty 
explaining why Holland stopped giving economic aid to 
Suriname in December 1982 after a series of killings had taken 
place, but claimed this was because those events had shown very 
clearly that the Government was no longer representative of the 
people. Yet, in the case of Indonesia, it was precisely after a 
period of nation-wide slaughter (1965-6) when an estimated one 
million people were killed, that the western powers got together 
and set up the IGGI and launched its programme of massive 
yearly credit to Indonesia. 
International Consortium Lends Indonesia $750 million 
An international syndicate of banks co-ordinated by Chase 
Manhattan Asia Bank agreed in March to grant Indonesia credit 
of $750 million on very favourable commercial terms. The 
remarkable fact about this decision is that the amount is 50% 
more than Indonesia asked for, and is taken as being a sign of the 
confidence of the international banking system in the Indonesian 
economy. Altogether 79 banks are involved in the consortium. 
The leading members are Chase Manhattan, Lloyds Bank 
International, Morgan Guaranty Trust, the Bank of Tokyo and 
the Industrial Bank of Japan. 
A leading Indonesiah economist and businessman, Pang Lay 
Kim, who is closely associated with the Centre of Strategic and 
International Studies recently told an audience of students in 
Bandung that Indonesia's ability to win so much confidence from 
the world's financiers is something to be proud of. WhiCh 
country in the world , he said, can get more credit than it asked 
for? He went on: 
Anyone with a lot of debts is king . Creditors don't want you to 
collapse and die. On the contrary, they will do everythmg to keep you 
alive and well , to make sure they get their money back. (Sinar 
Harapan, 4 May, 1984.) 
This possibly explains why reports are now circulating that 
moves are afoot to remove Holland from the chairmanship of the 
IGGI. Reporting this, the Dutch daily De Waarheid (16 April , 
1984) said that behind the moves is a desire on the part of the 
international banking syndicate which has just granted this huge 
line of credit to Indonesia to exert greater control over the 
deliberations of the IGGI. Could it be that Indonesia's 
international creditors are worried by growing pressure from 
political parties and human rights groups on the Dutch 
Government to revise its policy towards Indonesia? 
.............. 
DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS INDONESIA 
On March 27, the Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-
Jensen arrived in Jakarta on an official visit to Indonesia, as part 
of a journey to all the ASEAN countries in order to promote 
Danish exports. 
On April 9, Danish television carried a report on the visit by 
Danish journalist Tommy Osterlund who spoke about the recent 
activities of the death squads in Indonesia. After interviewing a 
representative of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta about the 
killings, Osterlund asked the Foreign Minister if he had talked to 
his Indonesian hosts about the death squads. The Minister said: 
No. He had gone for a different purpose, to promote Danish 
exports . Nor had he gone there in order to teach the Indonesians 
how to run their own country. "So does it mean," Tommy 
Osterlund asked, "that you leave your conscience behind when 
you travel?" The Foreign Minister, a former journalist, replied: 
"This is such an objectionable question that I will not answer it," 
adding that some countries try to "work things out in a 
reasonable manner". In his opinion, "Indonesia is reasonably 
stable politically." 
When the Danish conservative paper, Berlingske Tidende 
published a letter criticising the Foreign Minister for his 
emphasis on Danish exports and for ignoring human rights, Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen responded (15 April) by saying that "it is the 
Danish Foreign Minister with Suharto. (Sinar Harapan, 29 March 1984.) 
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policy of this Government to condemn violations of human 
rights no matter where they take place." He also stated that the 
question of human rights was discussed in the United Nations, 
insisting that "in this area, no one can question the commitment 
of the Danish Government. " 
It so happens that the very day the Danish Foreign Minister 
arrived in Jakarta, Indonesian military aircraft violated Papua 
New Guinea territory and flew low over Green River region , 
intimidating the inhabitants. Reporting this, another Danish 
daily , Information ( 4 April) pointed out that the Foreign 
Minister has offered Indonesia an interest-free loan of 120 
million Krona, yet only a few days before his visit to Jakarta, the 
Minister announced that Denmark would stop giving economic 
assistance to Vietnam and close down its embassy in Hanoi 
because the country maintains troops on foreign soil. 
Like so many other West European countries, Denmark has 
often condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but has 
never condemned Indonesia's invasion of East Timar. Not even 
in 1975 did Denmark protest against the invasion; it has 
abstained on every single UN resolution about East Timar since 
the very beginning. So much for the Danish Government's 
concern about human rights. From Torben Retb@ll 
French Minister for Tourism and Trade, Edith Cresson meets Suharto. 
(Sinar Harapan, 13 February 1984.) 
The illustrations on pages 11 and 13 of bulletin No. 62 were done by Hans 
Borkent. 
South Pacific regarded as Indonesia's "backyard" 
The current tension.s in Indonesia's relations with Papua New 
Guin!!a have prompted senior foreign policy strategists in 
Jakarta to raise the question of Indonesia's role as a Pacific 
power. This call for a reappraisal of the geographical focus of 
Indonesia's foreign poicy is atso inspired by a sense of unease at 
the hasty visit made by Foreign Minister Mochtar 
Kusumaatmaja in September last year to several South Pacific 
countries to plead for support at the UN on the question of East 
Timor. The strategists, who have been quoted at length in a 
report in Kompas (23 April 1984), make no secret ei.ther of their 
fear that the struggles being waged by Fretilin in East Timar and 
the OPM in West Papua are convincing the countries of the 
South Pacific that Indonesia is .intent upon dominating the whole 
region. 
A "two-door policy" 
Soelaeman Pringgodigdo, who heads the Economic, Social and 
Cultural Relations Directorate of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, believes that Indonesia should become a member of the 
South Pacific forum and · start attending its meetings as an 
observer as soon as possible . ' 
Indonesia should have two front doors in foreign affairs, one to Asia 
and one to the Pacific, so that we can keep a watch .on all political and 
military movements in the West and South-West rac;ific. This.is very 
important bearing in mind that these islands are· directly connected 
with Indonesia's own backyard, the region of Eastern Indonesia . 
Dr M. Hadi Soesastro of the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, the think-tank formerly of General Ali 
Murtopo and now of General Benny Murdani, also stressed the 
need for Indonesia to pay attention to "its backyard" because 
Indonesia itself consists of a number of ethnic groups and it so 
happens that those living in the eastern part of Indonesia have a 
cultural affinity with most of the South Pacific islands. 
He connected this with a statement made recently by the PNG 
Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu on his arrival in Jakarta in 
mid-April to attend talks with the Indonesian Foreign Minister 
on Indonesia's violations of PNG territory. Namaliu's statement, 
which infuriated many people in Jakarta because it was seen as 
"interference" in Indonesian internal affairs, suggested that 
PNG could help Indonesia "understand the culture and way of 
life of the Melanesian people who live in Irian Jaya". (Sinar 
Harapan, 16 April 1984.) A typical response came from a group 
called "Forum of Communication between Indonesian-Irian 
Jaya Communities" which proclaimed that there is nothing 
anyone can teach Indonesia ab~ut such matters because it is a 
country composed of many ethnic groups. "For us, there is no 
such thing as Malay, Javanese or Melanesian cultures, there is 
only one culture, the Indonesian culture" (ibid.). 
The CSIS strategist also made the point that Indonesia "needs 
to pay attention to its backyard" (Kompas, 23 April 1984) and 
has concentrated far too much on its relations with Asia and with 
the developed countries of the world, Japan, the USA and the 
countries of western Europe "because of our emphasis on 
development". The trouble is , he said , that the peoples of the 
South Pacific are suspicious of Indonesia which looks to them 
like "big brother" . This is particularly true of PNG as a result of 
"indoctrination by Australian administrators and int.ellectuals at 
the "time Indonesia incorporated West Irian and th.en East 
Timar" . 
They spread the idea that Indonesia is expansionist so we need to 
tread carefully so as to eliminate that impression. 
Dr Lie Tek Tjeng, a research scholar at UPI (Indonesia's 
Institute of the Sciences) also recognises that Indonesia's 
relations with the South Pacific could be undermined by such 
things as East Timar, the OPM and the RMS (South Moluccas 
Republic). The countries of the South Pacific all have small 
populations and tend to look upon Indonesia as a "giant" that 
could dominate the South Pacific. 
Groups hostile to Indonesia like the OPM, the RMS and Fretilin can 
exploit these factors . The countries of the South Pacific can easily 
believe such things because they know very little about Indonesia. 
Moreover those who put such ideas to them are, racially speaking, 
their brothers with identical cultures. 
"Malay-type" Indonesians 
Soelaeman Pringgodigdo also sees the problem as being closely 
related to Indonesia's cultural identity, to the way it projects 
itself as an Asian nation. He is concerned that the faces.used on 
posters, in television programmes and elsewhere are all "Malay-
type" faces, "never a single profile of anyone from the ethnic 
groups of Eastern Indonesia". He advocated an active 
programme of cultural exchange with the South Pacific, with 
Indonesia using in particular the peoples of Eastern Indonesia 
. who have a cultural affinity with the people of the South Pacific 
islands . And, he added, "it would be very good for our national 
defence if Indonesia should not only be a member of ASEAN 
but also of the South Pacific Forum." 
More votes at the UN 
But for Lei Tek Tjeng, it is all very much a question of votes at 
the UN, certainly with East Timar in mind: 
The South Pacific is very closely related to the African countries 
which form the largest bloc in the UN, also with the non-a~igned bloc 
and the bloc of 77. We could take advantage of all these relations. 
And the fact of the matter is that in the UN, every state counts as one 
vote. 
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East Timor 
The "Timor Gap": Oil and Trouble 
' . 
The seabed between East Timor and 
Australia is now known to contain rich oil 
deposits which could amount to as much as 
5 .billion barrels plus 50,000 billion cubic 
feet of natural gas reserves. This would put 
the area among the top 25 oilfields in the 
world. No wonder then that Australian oil 
companies which have been exploring the 
region's wealth have urged the Australian 
governmen! to press for a satisfactory 
conclusion to negotiations with Indonesia 
about the maritime boundary between the 
two countries . 
The history of the present wrangle 
between Australia and Indonesia dates 
back to 1973 when the two countries 
agreed that the maritime boundary should 
follow the "Timor trough", a seabed 
canyon some 30-50 miles off the south 
coast of Timar which marks the end of the 
Australian continental shelf. The boundary 
however could not be completed because 
the eastern half of Timar was then a 
Portuguese· colony . The 250 km gap in the 
agreed boundary came to be known as the 
'Timar gap'. 
Major oil companies began to develop 
interests in this off-shore regfon during the 
late 1960s. In the Portuguese colony, an 
Australian oil company, Tim or Oil 
concluded an agreement with Woodside-
Burmah (54.5% controlled by Burmah 
Oil), giving Timor Oil a 70% share in the 
offshore oil. In the Indonesian half of the 
island, another Australian company, 
International Oil had entered into a 
production-sharing contract with the 
Indonesian state oil company, Pertamina . 
In 1974, Woodside-Burmah acquired a 
65% interest in· International Oil. This 
gave Woodside-Burmah a major interest in 
the region . 
Then in September 1974, the 
Portuguese administration in East Timar 
turned its preference towards US 
companies and awarded exploration rights 
to Adobe Oil and Gas . Not long 
afterwards, in December that year, the 
Portuguese awarded Oceanic of Denver a 
concession of 23,192 square miles covering 
an area which intruded onto the Australian 
continental shelf. In other words, Portugal 
was disregarding the boundary agreement 
concluded the previous year between 
Australia and Indonesia, and awarded 
concessions in areas that had already been 
awarded by the Australian government to 
the Arco, Aquitaine and Exxon 
companies. The ensuing controversy drew 
attention to the Australian government's 
problem - a need to finalise the maritime 
boundary which the Portuguese had 
refused to recognise. 
In the belief that Indonesia viewed 
Australian demands more favourably and 
relying on the agreement that had been 
concluded in 1973, Australian oil interests 
14 
welcomed the Indonesian annexation of 
East Timar with relief. The decision of the 
Malcolm Fraser government to give de . 
facto recognition to the anm:xation in 1977 
and de Jure recognition in January 1978 was 
prompted above all by a desire to pave the . 
way for new negotiations on the boundary 
and make it possible for exploitation to 
begin without delay . Australian eagerness 
to press ahead with exploitation was 
reinforced by the discovery late last year of 
the Jabiru oil deposit, following 
exploration carried out by a consortium 
headed by Broken Hill Proprietary Co, 
Australia's biggest firm . The field is 
conservatively estimated to contain about 
250 million barrels of recoverable oil (Far 
Eastern Review, 19 April 1984), and is well 
within the section formerly acknow1edged 
by Indonesia as belongin~ to ~ustqilia . 
Indonesia wants to re-negotiate , 
the boundary agreement 
Small wonder then that the Australian 
government .and major oil inte.rests have 
been profoundly . disturbed by ,ndonesiap , 
proposals to re-negotiate the maritime 
boundary, arguing that since the 
continental shelf between the two 
countries is continuous, . the boundary 
should be drawn at a point equidjstant 
between the two countries. For Australia, 
this would lead to the loss of major oil and 
gas resources and of substantial revenues 
accruing from the presence of companies 
such as Woodside-Burmah and Elf-
Aquitaine. 
Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaat-
maja, himself a specialist on sea. law, 
recently argued that the Law of the Sea 
Convention was on Indonesia's s.ide: 
The Indonesian position is based squarely on 
the law existing at present. The Australian 
position is that we should just draw a line 
connecting the old boundary lines. In effect, 
it is saying: "Negotiate in 1984 on the basis of 
the 1958 convention which has already been 
revised". It is an untenable position. 
(Interview, Far Eastern Economic Review, 
19 April 1984) . 
For the Australian government, the 
TIHOR s~:A 
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tricky situation is further aggravated by the 
:Labour Party's policy to withdraw 
recognition of Indonesia's annexation of 
East Timor. The policy has already been 
thrown overboard by the Hawke 
government, but there will be strong 
pressure at the ALP Conference in July 
this year to uphold the policy and force the 
government to change its position. So, just 
as Mochtar was describing Australia's 
position as "untenable" , the Australian 
Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, was 
pleading with Australians to afford 
Indonesia's annexation of East Timar "a 
certain recognition" because of the 
"extraordinarily complex and difficult and 
demanding negotiations" going on with 
1.ndonesia over the · seabed boundary. 
Speaking at the Joint Services Staff College 
he said: 
There is . as you know, a large gap off East 
Timor in that boundary. In that gap is 
positioned the natural gas fields and 
·probably oil , fields . We would not be 
regarded with great public celebration if we 
were' to make a mess of those negotiations , 
and yet the implication of the negotiations is 
that as the area open or undefined at 'this 
point is off East Tim or, a certain recognition 
must be established to East Timor. For some 
people in my party who have expressed 
concern about the presence of Indonesia in 
East Timor, there is a cold, hard, sobering 
reality that must also be addressed in tespect 
of those other interests we must attend to. 
(Canberra Times, 18 April 1984) 
The reasons for current Australian 
government policy on East Timar could 
hardly have been put more bluntly. 
As · for the Indonesia 'position, whether 
or not its interpretation of the Law of the 
Sea Convention is correct is beside the 
point. The crucial fact is that it has no right 
in the first place to be negotiating the 
boundary betweep East Timar and 
Australia. It is as well to recognise that the 
recent oil finds south of East Timar would 
make, that country a m;:ijor oil producer 
with enough resources to heal the 
devastating damage done to its people 
during the course of Indonesia's war of 
annexation. 
A-B - 'Timor gap'- East Timor's territorial waters. 
?a -Area disputed by Australia and Indonesia. 
-Boundary agreed in 1973. 
-Median line boundary claimed by Indonesia . 
..,...BPH-Ausiralia's Jabiru oilfield. 
Tapols and ex-tapols 
The trials and tribulations of tried 
political prisoners 
There are still at least 300 political prisoners in Indonesia who 
were arrested and tried in connection with the 1965 events. The 
show trials were held in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Several 
dozen of those convicted were given deaih sentences and are 
awaiting the results of appeals for commutation. The rest are 
serving long prison sentences, and often face insuperable 
difficulties in their legal battles to speed up their release. Many are 
already advanced in age and ailing, while some have lost all 
contact with their families. 
The following information is based on cases known to 
TA POL, though the identities of the prisoners have not been 
revealed. It is vital to draw attention to the plight of these forgotten 
prisoners and to press for their immediate release. 
**** 
W, a low-ranking soldier in the Indonesian Army, was arrested 
in October 1965 during the mass arrests that swept the country as 
General Suharto consolidated' his seizure of power and moved 
against members or suspected members of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) . He was 33 years old at the time of his 
arrest . 
It was not until 1978, 13 years after his arrest that W was 
brought to trial, one of the small minority of 'A' category 
prisoners scheduJed for trial. Being a soldier, he was tried before 
a military court in East Java. Nothing is known about the charges 
against him or about his defence. He was found guilty and 
sentenced to 20 years. But on top of that, the court passed down 
this severe sentence without deduction for the pre-trial period of 
detention . The convicted man decided to exercise his right to 
appeal, first to the High Court, then to the Supreme Court. Both 
upheld the sentence. The appeals took years to complete, and 
his sentence did not commence until allthis had been finalised, 
until, that is to say, the "execution of sentence" order had been 
issued in 1982. The 20-year sentence is therefore due to run until 
2002, though with luck W could be released by 1992 if he gets 
remission normally due to him and is released "on parole" or 
"conditional release". By then, he will have served 27 years and 
will be 60 years old. That is the best he can hope for. 
J, another soldier, is much "better off' . He too was arrested 
in 1965, also in East Java, and was brought for trial in 1971. He 
too was given a stiff sente~ce of 20 years, but in his case, the 
sentence took effect immediately, possibly because he did not 
exercise his right to llppeal. His remission rights began to take 
effect from 1972, and he was released "on parole" in 1981, 
having served "poly" 16 . years: In his case the court verdict did 
allow deduction for pre-trial detention . 
Another prisoner arrested .in 1965 was, like W, not tried until 
1978, but got a heavier sentence of life imprisonment. With a 
"life" sentence, no provision needs to be made about deducting 
pre-trial detention. In his case, the execution of sentence order 
was issued immediately after sentence was passed. Moreover, it 
is usual for "life" sentences to be automatically reduced to 15 
years after the first fiv.e years have been served. This prisoner 
was notified of the reduction to 15 years in 1982; since he had 
served 13 years · in pre-trial detention, he was informed that he 
had only another 2 .years to serve, so hopes to be released this 
year. Indeed, quite a few "life" prisoners have already been 
released, leaving behind numerous prisoners serving "lighter'' 
sentences but unable to extricate themselves because of the 
procedural quagmire and the arbitrary decisions inflicted on 
them by judges or other officials. 
Or, take the case of another prisoner, a civilian, arrested 
somewhere in Kalimantan, also in October 1965, After 10 years 
in detention, he was brought to trial and sentenced to 20 years. 
When he announced his intention to appeal , he requested that 
the appeal be heard before a High Court in another Kalimantan 
town . Years dragged by without any information about the fate 
of his appeal. After many enquiries had been made , he was 
informed that the appeal had not yet been lodged and he should 
send the documents to the court himself. Not long afterwards, he 
was informed by the court in question that it was not competent 
to hear his appeal and advised him to appeal to another High 
Court, adding however, that he would have to wait because this 
other court had not yet been constituted! 
Then there is the case of S, arrested in January 1968 and 
brought to trial more than ten years later, in May 1978. The 
court found him guilty and passed a sentence of 13 years with 
deduction for pre-trial detention. This should have meant 
release in 1981 , or even earlier counting remission . Yet, Sis still 
in prison, because the prosecution exercised its right to appeal 
against the sentence and press for a higher one. Although S has 
not been told whether the prosecution's appeal has been 
granted, it might as well have been as he has already served an 
extra three years. 
Yet another set of problems face some prisoners whose 
sentences have been fully served. There are two prisoners in a 
prison in Central Java whose appeals procedures have been 
completed, and remission granted. Yet although their sentences 
have expired, the release documents have not been issued. 
Although the various court and prosecution authorities had 
given the necessary approval, the military authority in the 
locality where the prisoners are to go have refused to endorse the 
release and allow the men to return home. 
Pre-trial detention 
One of the most glaring injustices in the sentences passed against 
political prisoners is that many verdicts fail to grant deduction 
for pre-trial detention . In 1981, a new Procedural Code 
(KUHAP) was adopted clearly stipulating (Article 22, para 4) 
that the period of pre-trial detention must be deducted from the 
sentence passed. The problem is however that the 1981 
Procedural Code is not applicable to cases brought under certain 
laws, including the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law. (See Article 284, 
para 2 of the Code.) 
The question of deductible pre-trial detention for political 
prisoners was thrown into utter confusion by a Supreme Court 
Circular issued to judges .in February 1977. The Circular drew a 
distinction between "judicial detention", i.e. detention by the 
ordinary law-enforcement agencies, and "non-judicial 
detention", i.e. detention carried out under the special powers of 
Kopkamtib, · the Army's Operational Command for the 
Restoration of Security and Order. The Circular specifically 
excluded Kopkamtib detention from deductibility when 
sentences are passed on the grounds that it is "non-judicial". 
Since so many political prisoners brought to trial served up to ten 
years or more as "non-judicial" detainees of Kopkamtib, this had 
the effect of greatly increasing the term of imprisonment actually 
served. After an outcry from some lawyers, the Supreme Court 
followed with a second Circula~ advising judges that they could 
decide whether or not to deduct Kopkamtib detention. In 
November 1978, Kopkamtib issued a decision stipulating that 
Kopkamtib detention could be deducted, but leaving it to judges 
to decide. A court verdict passed as recently as April this year 
(see box) reveals that judges continue to use their discretion in 
deciding whether to exclude Kopkamtib detention when 
determining the date from which a sentence runs. 
Another provision of the 1981 Procedural Code that is being 
denied political prisoners is the provision (Article 268) that the 
sentence shall run while appeals are in progress. The Code also 
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establishes time limits for appeals procedures, by contrast with 
the experience of many tried political prisoners whose appeals 
have dragged on for so many years. 
The central issue as far as the tried political prisoners is 
concerned is the flagrant injustice of the political trials to which 
they were subjected. But many of the prisoners consider that 
they could speed up their release by insisting that provisions now 
forma lly incorporated into the 1981 Procedural Code should 
apply in their cases too. All the 1965 political trials were held 
Agus Salim gets nine months plus . . . 
Agus Salim, the teacher arrested in Slawi , Central Java for 
telling students about his experiences during the 1978 
student movement (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 62 , March 
1984) has been found guilty of " insulting the President of 
the Republic" under Article 134 of the Criminal Code and 
sentenced to nine months imprisonment. (Tempo, 21 April 
1984.) This is a month less than the sentence demanded by 
the prosecution because , said the presiding judge, the 
defendant "is still a young man and he behaved politely 
during the trial" . The circ;umstance which aggravated his 
case was that "he gave a bad example to his students, in 
conflict with ethical standards". 
However , the nine-month sentence will not run from 13 
May 1983, the day he was arrested by the military 
commander of Central Java acting as regional officer of 
Kopkamtib . It will run from 9 November, the day his case 
was transferred by Kopkamtib to the police , the public 
prosecutor's office and the court. In other words , 
Kopkamtib's "non-judicial" detention is not being 
deducted and Agus Salim will serve altogether 15 months. 
Tempo reports that Agus Salim 's trial probably stands 
out as the best-attended trial ever held in Slawi . Some 
4,0oo· people attended sessions, inside the courtroom or 
following the proceedings from the forecourt outside . 
before the Code came into effect, ye t the Code does allow for its 
provisions to be applied "as far as possible" (Article 284, para I) 
to cases heard before the Code became law. The worst 
stumbling-block however is the exclusion of "subversion" cases 
from the procedures laid down in the Code . The Slawi court 
decision shows that this issue is not only the concern of the 1965 
prisoners but also of anyone likely, on the flimsiest of pretexts, 
to find him- or herself charged before a court of law as a 
"subversive" . The Slawi case decision (see box) which was not 
based on the anti-subversion law but on the charge of "insulting 
the head of state" also shows that "non-judicial " Kopkamtib 
detention can have the effect of almost doubling the term of 
imprisonment imposed by a court of law. 
* * * 
FORCED LABOUR FOR EX-TAPOLS 
A number of ex-tapols in Central Java have been ordered to 
participate in a forced labour project to reclaim waste land in the 
region of Kedungmundu , east of Semarang .. The land is being 
replanted with guava trees for a State plantation. 
Suara Merdeka (27 February 1984) reports that the people 
recruited to do this "kerja bakti" ("voluntary" labour) are 
individuals who are "under guidance" from the authorities , 
living in nine villages in the locality. The project involves the 
planting of 1,200 seedlings and took place under the watchful eye 
of the local carnal (sub-district chief) , the Korarnil (military) 
commander and the police chief. The carnal was quoted as saying 
that "as government officials , we want to give them guidance and 
encourage them to participate in development activities". He 
was proud to be able to say that they were willing to do what was 
being required of them "even though this is a holiday". 
The . military officer wh.o was there to help supervise the 
project said that similar projects would be undertaken in other 
villages. "We want them to be really conscious, to be willing to 
comply with government requiremen~s , not to try and conc<?al 
their whereabouts by leaving Java without permission, and so 
on ." A Plantation Service· official said that his office is planning 
to plant 20,000 seedlings in similar projects . 
A contact in Central J;tviJ. has pointed out in a private 
communication that the people "under guidance" are all ex-
tapols, and more could be drawn into similar forms of forced 
labour if nothing is done to stop it quickly. 
Foriller tapols and the communist bogy 
Communists "struggling to achieve their purpose" in Indonesia 
"no longer regard ex-G30S/PKI" political prisoners as useless. 
They regard them , as well as the PKI remnants who were never 
arrested , as strategically important potential forces for the 
restoration of communism in Indonesia", said General 
Soepardjo Roestam, Minister for the Interior. 
Remarks like this , made in a speech at an indoctrination 
course for officials of the Department of the Interior (Kompas, 
31March1984) again draw attention to the extreme vulnerability 
of former political prisoners . In a letter to T APOL received 
recently from Indonesia, a former political prisoner writes that 
the Jakarta press , in particular the Jakarta Post , reports 
frequently about "the communist danger and the need to 
intensify supervision of the former political prisoners". Reports 
about increased criminality and even about the "Children of 
God" sect that was outlawed in Indonesia earlier this year are 
also linked with "communism". 'f.he theme is stressed time and 
time again by such people as Major-General Amir Machmud, 
chairman of Parliament, Major-General Tri Sutrisno, military 
commander of Jakarta , as well as by General Benny Murdani , 
Arme~ Forces Commander-in-Chief. 
The ex-tapol reminds us that all former prisoners are required · 
to · re-register with their local Koramil (military sub-district 
command) every six months and to submit each time six passport 
photos, a photocopy of their release document (KTP) and , .for 
those with jobs, a declaration from their employer. 
The press often gives 'space to unsubstantiated reports about 
"ex-PKI" members. One claimed recently that two PKI leaders 
had managed to slip back into Indonesia from Vietnam and had 
been arrested, though no names were ever mentioned. Other 
reports allege that former tapols have moved to other parts of 
the country without reporting to the authorities . Another report 
claimed that two former members of the banned People's Youth 
succeeded in returning home from Europe but were arrested 
soon afterwards , one in Solo and one in Medan. No-one has 
been able to provide more details about these cases . 
The ex-tapol also explains that after the weekly Topik was 
forced to suspend publication for publishing an editorial on 
poverty (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 62, March 1984), the editors-
in-chief of all publications in Jakarta were summoned to a · 
meeting with the authorities and warned not to publish any 
articles written by ex-tapols from Buru. In March last year, the 
monthly journal Prisma was reprimanded for publishing articles 
by two ex-tapols . The warning issued in 1984 is regarded, he 
says, as far more serious because it is directed against ex~tapols 
in general. · . · 
'Get to know the enemy,' says general 
General Soepardjo's warning to Department of the Interior 
officials also· urged them to familiarise themselves "with the 
dangers of communist teachings and work hard 'to arouse the 
motivation and ideological resilience of the entire government 
apparatus and the broad mass of the people" . The general was 
worried because the suppression of everything to do with 
communist teachings since 1966 has been so effective that people 
are even afraid to possess and study books by anti-communists 
analysing the danger; tactics and strategy of commQnism. "A 
whole generation has grown up since 1965," he said, ''which is 
completely ignorant about communism . . . It would be irony 
indeed if officials in civilian and legal affairs as well as in the 
Armed Forces knew virtually nothing about this most dangerous 
enemy." (Kompas, 31 March , 1984) 
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Human rights abuse 
TOPIK reappears ... 
The Jakarta weekly, Topik, which was banned in February this 
year for publishing an editorial that, according to the 
Government, "advocated class struggle" (see TAPOL Bulletin , 
No 62, March 1984) has been allowed to reappear, after having 
accepted a number of conditions restraining editorial policy, and 
after having completely overhauled its editorial staff. 
But non-government newspapers like Kompas and Sinar 
Harapan often carry unobtrusive reports of the discovery of 
corpses in Jakarta, giving facts that suggest they are the victims 
of the death-squads. Most corpses bear the marks of torture, 
mutilation or gunshot wounds, and some have been discovered 
wrapped up in sacks . The most recent reports from Jakarta were 
in Sinar Harapan on 17 April (three unidentified bodies) and 18 
April (two unidentified bodies). 
The ban was lifted by the Information Department after the 
journal's proprietor had agreed in writing not to publish anything 
that could "disturb the community" or is "a slander of the state 
leadership" . It also agreed to conform with the journalists' Code 
of Ethics, with government provisions and with a People 's 
Assembly decree in 1966 outlawing the dissemination of 
communist teachings. 
The Institute estimates that there were at least 4,000 killings 
in 1984. This figure does not include the estimate of 8,500 deaths 
in East Java reported by a Dutch journalist who visited the 
province in January (Vrijx Nederland , 11 February, 1984). 
The other Jakarta weekly, Expo, which was banned a month 
earlier than Topik has not yet been. allowed to resume 
publication. The Chief Editor is still pressing the Information 
Department for permission to reappear, but since he is the man 
directly responsible for the articles about Indonesia's one 
hundred billionaires that caused the offense leading to the ban, it 
would seem Expo is unlikely to get an early reprieve. 
Source: Tempo, 5 May, 1984 . 
. . . and FOKUS disappears 
The Jakarta weekly, FOKUS, was banned on 10 May "for pub-
lishing things that could intensify social conflict", and is accused 
of being "speculative" and "sensational", according to a decision 
of the Minister for Information. 
Death-squads 
The Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (LBH) issued a statement on 
26 April reporting a new upswing in the number of death-squad 
killings in Indonesia. Reuters (Volkskrant, 27 April 1984) 
quoted the Institute as saying that hundreds more alleged 
criminals have been shot dead or killed in other ways since the 
beginning of 1984. The Institute holds the Army and Police 
responsible for the killings and strongly condemns the fact that 
the gunning down of people in the streets has now become an 
accepted part of everyday life in Indonesia . Popular journals 
frequently publish photographs of the tortured bodies of victims, 
although the press has been ordered not to refer any more to 
"mysterious" killings or to the Army's "anti-crime" operations 
which are responsible for the death-squad activities. 
Lieutenant-General Ali Murtopo, who died this month, a loyal associate 
of Suharto since the 1950s. In charge of OPSUS (Special Operations), he 
masterminded the destruction of the political parties and, in 1974-5, 
directed Operasi Komodo, to destabilise East Timor. 
Punished for missing a flag ceremony 
A village clerk named Saimin, aged 62, col-
lapsed and died while doing push-ups as 
punishment for not attending a flag-raising 
ceremony to mark the anniversary of Kor-
pri, the civil servants' association which all 
government employees are required to 
join. The punishment was inflicted on 
Saimin and more than twenty other local 
government officials who had failed to turn 
up for the Korpri ceremony. 
The tragedy occurred last November in 
the Balong kecamatan (subdistrict) near 
Ponorogo, in East Java, when the camat, a 
man named Winarto, summoned all those 
who had stayed away. Like Saimin, most 
had . stayed at home to spend the time 
working on their fields after a sudden 
downpour of rain provided a good oppor-
tunity to do some ploughing. 
After reprimanding the men, Winarto 
ordered a police officer to punish them. 
They were first told to run round a field the 
size of a football pitch fifteen times, and 
then to do five push-ups. It was too much 
for Saimin who collapsed before finishing 
the push-ups. By the time the other men 
had got him to the local health centre, he 
was dead. 
Saimin's body was taken to a local hos-
pital, though neither the camat nor the 
policeman took the trouble to help. But 
the staff at the hospital refused to examine 
the body to determine the cause of death as 
no-one could afford to pay the fee of Rp. 
150,000. No death certificate was issued 
and the body was buried without further 
investigation. 
But since the tragedy, his family have 
fought pard to press the authorities to in-
vestigate the incident and to initiate pro-
ceedings against the two men responsible 
for .Saimin's death. So far, all that has hap-
pened is that both have been transferred to 
other posts. "We're only little people," 
said one of his sons, "but don't think we 
can't make demands." So far, an investiga-
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tion has been refused because of the lack of 
a death certificate. 
As for the camat, he has no regrets: 
"The men were being punished for lack of 
discipline, for not attending the flag cere-
mony. In any case," he said, "Saimin had a 
weak heart, and he would have died even 
without the push-ups." 
Source: Tempo, 17 March 1984. 
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We must stop eing arrogant, says 
Indonesian doctor 
Doctor Suriadi Gunawan worked as a doctor in Irian Jaya for 
more than 18 years. He went there with the very first volunteers 
in 1962 and enjoyed working there so much , he decided to stay 
on. The following interview was published in Higina, a new 
popular monthly devoted to questions of health and hygiene . 
******* 
Can you say something about diseases in the interior of Irian. 
Why is it thought that the people there don't live long? 
The diseases vary from place to place . In more isolated or 
high-altitude regions , they differ from lowland or coastal 
regions . There is a high incidence of disease precisely in those 
places in contact with outsiders , particularly along the coast. The 
local environment and degree of isolation are factors 
determining the spread of disease. Some places are more 
difficult to keep clean than urban areas. But there are isolated 
regions which had no incidence of disease before coming into 
contact with outsiders, and only after making contact did 
illnesses like influenza occur. Leprosy and tuberculosis were also 
originally unknown in the interior and in the mountains. 
As a matter of fact , they have been able to develop eating 
habits that protect them against disease. They eat tubers and 
leaves which contain a lot of vitamins, so you don't find anyone 
in the interior suffering from vitamin A deficiency, for example. 
They also make good use of animal proteins and eat all kinds of 
things like snakes, worms, lizards, small rats and so on, all of 
which are rich in calories, even though these creatures are 
difficult to catch . Strange to say, it is only after children start 
going to school that you find vitamin deficiency because they 
learn not to want to eat the things they have eaten in the interior. 
Or, because they spend a lot of time at school, they don't have 
time to go to the gardens with their parents to pick tubers and 
leaves or catch animals to eat. The people in the interior make 
excellent use of all kinds of foodstuffs without discrimination; 
they eat anything edible . It 's only when people from the towns 
come and tell them not to eat this, that or the other - snakes, 
for instance, bec.ause it's haram - that the trouble begins. Such 
prohibitions are quite unnecessary as long as what they do isn't 
harmful. In fact , most of it is beneficial. 
It's true they don't live long. Apart from tribal wars , this is 
because they live in such a difficult environment. Many get killed 
in accidents. There is a high mortality rate among children, 
perhaps because the little ones don't have the necessary 
resistance to their environment. But once they grow up, they 
adapt to their natural environment. 
The people in the interior have no sense of being inferior to 
people from the towns . They regard themselves as human 
beings, even as the real human beings . They therefore have no 
sense of inferiority. Their self-respect is strong, and they do not 
feel dependent on anyone , not like town people who feel 
dependent on local officials, for example. They live their lives by 
their own efforts, gather their own food, hunt animals for 
themselves. People from the towns may think they are richer or 
better educated, but when they make contact with people in the 
interior of Irian, they should discard such ethnocentrist 
feelings ... 
You have discovered illnesses which you would not have imagined 
existed in the interior of Irian Jaya. What are they? 
Tape worm. At first, I did not imagine that this would exist 
there. Then, in the 1970s, I visited a hospital in Enarotali. A 
number of patients were suffering from burns. A few years 
earlier, there had only been five but when I came this time there 
were more than forty. I began to wonder why. Then, I 
discovered that the patients with burns also had lumps on their 
bodies , and further examination revealed they were suffering 
from tape-worm . So , what was the connection between the burns 
and the tape-worm? I came to the conclusion that the patients 
with burns had had convulsions . The climate in the interior is 
very cold and many people sleep or sit very dose to fires . When 
they get a convulsion, they lose consciousness, and without 
realising it , they fall into the fire and get badly burnt. The 
convulsions are caused by growths on the brain . The tape worms 
spread all over the body , even into the brain , and cause the 
convulsions . 
Other diseases to be found there are goitre and cerebral 
malaria . There is also a lot of gonorrhoea brought in by 
outsiders . 
What is the effect of not wearing clothes on their health? Does this 
affect their resistance to disease? 
Of course, there is a connection, but they have been able to 
adapt to their environment over a long period of time . I am not 
suggesting that they should be left to live without clothes, but I 
think that with time, as their economic conditions improve, they 
will come to this themselves. It's not enough to have a single 
item of clothing. They would need to have many items of 
clothing as well as soap, and they would need to know something 
about simple, practical hygiene. Sometimes, they are forced to 
wear clothes to go into town to report to the office of the local 
camat. Because they don't have enough clothes of their own, 
they _have to borrow things from their friends . This spreads 
disease because the clothes are not clean and have probably been 
worn by many other people. 
How should doctors approach the people in the interior? 
It isn't easy. Treatment provided by doctors or medical staff is 
very different from their concept of traditional medicine. How is 
this gap to be bridged? The first thing is to convince them that 
medical personnel have the power to cure them . They are not at 
all .bothered about our way of thinking but the important thing 
for them is whether medics can cure them. It's a pragmatic way 
of thinking, and they will come back for more treatment, and 
bring their children, if they feel confident we can eure them. 
Then, it's a matter of whether doctors can change their way of 
seeing things, and that isn't easy ... Doctors need to understand 
their way of thinking while at the same time being less 
condescending themselves ... Take for instance yaws, which 
exists on a wide scale in places remote from outside contact. 
There is an easy cure for that, but the cure doesn't necessarily 
change their way of thinking. They regard the medicine as 
magic, and think doctors have special powers as well, the power 
to cure them by injecting something into the body. It may take a 
whole generation before they can accept the scientific approach 
behind modern medicine. But this is not only found in Irian. 
There are still many people living in Jakarta who prefer magic to 
treat illnesses. 
Are any of the traditional medicines beneficial and acceptable to 
the medical world? 
We need to classify things, and this will take long and careful 
investigation. Not all doctors can do this, particularly if they 
haven't spent a long time in the region or integrated themselves 
with the environment. This is the task of social scientists, 
anthropologists and sociologists. 
Some of their methods are very acceptable to the medical 
profession. Take for instance their method of giving birth. 
Women in the interior give birth in a squatting positon or 
standing up, assisted by the dukun. This is excellent. lt's far 
easier to give birth squatting or standing up than lying down. 
Then, they have a different way of treating wounds or extracting 
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things from their flesh. When they pull out an arrow, they do it 
under water which is very correct according to medical science 
' .. If the arrow is extracted in the air, the open wound can be 
penetrated by the air, or air inside the body can attack the lungs, 
which can be fatal. Their "war experience" has taught them that 
if an arrow is extracted in the open, the wounded person can 
suffer shock or die . So they do it under water, with much better 
results . ' 
principles, but neither is it of any use. Yet, strangely, these 
methods often have the effect of curing the disease. Some forms 
of treatment they use cannot be classified as good or bad. For 
instance, mothers usually chew food before giving it to their 
children . I can't make up my mind whether this is good or bad. 
They live in the forest and have no way of preparing soft foods 
for their children , so they chew tubers before feeding them to 
chiJdreri who don't have teeth . This is quite understandable, but 
on the other hand, it may be a source of infection. More study is 
needed before deciding whether these things are good or bad. 
Sqme of their , methods of treatment are dangerous thou'gh , 
and not acceptable to medical science. They treat many illnesses 
by cutting the body. For a headache , they cut the forehead, 
thinking this will let out the ev.il spirit. This is unacceptable 
because the cut can itself become a source of infection . 
What would you say about the way we should approach people in 
the interior or Irian? 
There are other forms of treatment that are neutral in their 
effect, for instance rubbing the body with earth or other things, 
or cutting hair, and so on. This doesn't go against any scientific 
The main thing is· to get rid of our afrogance, to stop thinking 
we are more civilised than them . And above all, people must 
stop adopting an attitude of superiority. 
Why tape-\Vorill victiills \Viii have 
to wait 
Tape-worm is widespread in the Paniai reg-
ion and is so prominent in West Papua that 
. it is known to the medical profession in In-
donesia as "Irianese tape-worm" . The 
parasite incubates in pigs and spreads to 
humans. through contact with the animal or 
from eating pig-meat. Pigs have been 
teared in the region for many generations 
but ·the tape-worm only appeared in the 
early seventies and is believed to have 
originated from a herd of diseased pigs do-
nated to the community by President 
Suharto. The "gift" was described as a 
"peace offering" after Indonesian troops 
had quelled an uprising in 1969. 
The parasite causes cystocercosa, with 
lumps growing in all parts of the body, in-
cluding the brain. The cysts on the brain 
cause epileptic convulsions, hence the ten-
dency for people to fall in fires, as men-
tioned in Dr Suniardi's interview. 
An article in Tempo (6 August 1983) 
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also drew attention to the large number of 
papuans treated at Enarotali Hospital for 
severe burns. Up to 1976, reported one of-
ficial of the Department of Health, 231 
people were treated, of,whom 25 died, 21 
underwent amputati<;w.s , and 121 were left 
badly handicapped. In the following year 
(1977) - the most recent year for which 
data was available at the Department -
cystocercosa-related accidents had clearly 
risen sharply as 367 persons were treated 
for burns or acute epilepsy. 
Although the victims of cystocercosa-re-
lated accidents appear to be getting treat-
ment, no cure is available for the disease it-
self. The only drug in use, reports Tempo, 
kills the tapeworm but does not destroy the 
head or the eggs from which comes the lar-
vae which causes the cysts. A Catholic mis-
sionary, Pastor Yan van de Horst started 
looking for a cure not long after comir:ig to 
the area in the early seventies and discov-
ering that the loca.J : health clin.ics (puskes-
1ru1s) were providing no treatment at. all. 
After many enquiries with pharmaceutical 
companies in Europe, he recently disco-
vered a drug known a.s mebendazole which 
has ~he capacity to destroy the parasite 
completely. But unfortunately, reports 
Tempo, it is not on ,the list of medicines 
that may be imported into Indonesia. Yet 
without it, there is nothing the health au-
thorities can do, said Dr M. Adhiatua, Di-
rector-General of the Public Health Divi-
sion. of the Department of Health, "except 
advise people to change their personal 
habits and way of life, to cook pork well, to 
keep pigsties welJ away from their houses 
and maintain a gopd !eye! of hygiene, In 
terms of national pr.i0rities", he said, 
"tape-worm comes much lowe.r: down than 
other diseases like malaria, tuberculosis 
and so on." 
Children with "lrianese tape-worm". (Tempo, 6 August 1983.) 
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A PLEA TO OUR READERS AND SUPPORTERS 
Help keep TAPOL Bulletin going!--Oonations urgently needed! 
Rising costs should mean that our subscription rates must increase, but we hope to avoid this ... if those of 
.our readers and supporters who can afford it will send generous donations. . . . . . 
The human rights situation is as serious as eyer in Indonesia and becomm.g more diver~e, with 
disturbing implications for Papua New Guinea and the Pacific. We would prefer to wm more subscnbers by 
keeping our rates at their present level, with the. help of all those who support our work. 
T APOL Bulletin makes every endeavour to keep readers up to date and well ·informed on the ~any 
facets of human rights violations . From the many responses we get, we believe that our efforts are widely 
appreciated. 
Please send your donations as soon .as possible , to: 
TAPOL, 8a Treport Street, London SW18 2BP, UK. 
Front Murderer to Manggala 
A new term , "manggala" , has recently en-
tered the vocabulary of the Indonesian 
military regime . "Manggalas." writes a col-
umnist in Sinar Harapan (9 April. 1984) 
"are the ·cream of the Indonesian political 
elite, the people who have achieved post-
graduate excellence in Pancasila teaching." 
The word is taken from the time of the an-
cient Javanese Mojopahit empire; the 
"manggalas" were the oracles or wisemen 
of the regime . 
A special indoctrination course for 113 
"manggalas" was held at the Presidential 
Palace in Bogor in the last week of March, 
to mark the end of the third Five-Year Plan 
(Pelita Ill) . The participants were the "top 
graduates" from a number of nation-wide 
indoctrination courses conducted in the 
past year or so . It was a collection of 
people of such extraordinary intellectual 
calibre, writes Sinar Harapan. that only 
the best would do . No fewer than 14 mem-
bers of the Cabinet , including the Armed 
Forces Commander-in-Chief. General 
Benqy Murdani, and the Attorney-Gen-
eral , took time off to give them instruction . 
One of the most notorious of these 
exalted individuals is Lieutenant-General 
Sarwo Edhie, ·better known . for his ac-
tivities in 1965 and 1966 in another elitist 
role as COl1).ntander of the elite RPKAD, 
the paracoinmando regiment (now known 
Annual rates (six issues): 
UK, Europe and 
overseas/surface 
Individuals £ 7 .50 
Institutions £12.00 
TAPOL's GIRO account no: 56 7814009 
as Kopassandha) which spearheaded the 
massacres that swept through Central and 
East Java and other parts of the country , 
l'eaving an estimated one million people 
dead . These were the massacres that 
brought · about the annihilation of the In-
donesian Communist Party, and helped 
consolidate power in the hands of Suharto. 
Sarwo Edhie 's name is indelibly associated 
with the very worst of those death-squad 
atrocities. 
In 1968, Sarwo Ed hie was appointed 
military commander in Irian Jaya (West 
Papua) and was responsible for the cam-
paign of brutality and murder to crush 
groups rebelling against the Indonesian 
takeover and trying to oppose the "Act of 
Free Choice" in 1969 which, under severe 
military repression , sealed the fate of the 
territory as Indonesia's 26th province. 
After spending three years (1970-73) as 
Governor of the Armed Forces Academy 
(Akabri), Sarwo Edhie became ambas-
sador to South Korea at a time when 
Benny Murdani, still very much his junior, 
was Military Attache at the same embassy . 
He later became Inspector-General of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Having for 
whatever reason lost favour with General 
Suharto, this sample of military excellence 
is now a full-time "manggala" at the Office 
of Indoctrination (BP-7) which gives him 
Subscription rates 
the opportunity to teach others the qual-
ities and morality of Pancasila. 
Source: Tempo, 17 March 1984 
Sarwo Edhie with Suharto in 1965, then 
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